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DEVELOPMENTS IN MERGER LITIGATION:
THE GOVERNMENT DOESN'T ALWAYS WIN*
STEPHEN CALKINS**

"The sole consistency that I can find is that under Section 7, the
Government always wins."' When this famous antitrust apothegm was
pronounced in 1966 by Justice Stewart, dissenting in United States v. Von's
Grocery, it had the ring of truth.' It is less true today: of the (admittedly
few) reported Justice Department merger cases decided since William
Baxter assumed responsibility as Assistant Attorney General, the Government has lost all but one.' The Federal Trade Commission's court
record in merger cases has been substantially better.' Even in private
cases, usually involving challenges to mergers to which the federal antitrust agencies did not object, plaintiffs have won about half of the decisions on the merits.'
I. REVIEW OF MERGER LITIGATION IN THE COURTS
My assignment was to review recent merger litigation in the courts. A
brief examination of cases brought by the Justice Department, private
parties, and the FTC reveals that success rates vary substantially, that
* 0 1988 Stephen Calkins. An earlier version of this paper was presented August 10,
1987, at the Section 7 Committee Program at the Annual Meeting of the ABA Antitrust
Section, San Francisco, California.
** Associate professor, Wayne State University Law School. The author thanks William
Blumenthal, Edward J. Brunet, John Dolan, and J. Mark lwry for commenting on a draft
of this paper, other practicing lawyers too numerous to mention for discussing merger
litigation, and David L. Roll, Thomas J.McNamara, Patrick J. Roach, Stephen A. Stack,
Jr., Theodore Voorhees, Jr., Alan J. Weinschel, and the Federal Trade Commission and
the U.S. Department of Justice's Antitrust Division for making available copies of briefs.
Of course, all criticism should go exclusively to the author.
'United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
See, e.g., Kauper, The Warren Court and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populim and
Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REv. 325, 338 (1968); see also id. at 335 ("under the standards of
recent horizontal merger cases, the decision by the Department to proceed in a given case
is viewed as virtually determinative of the outcome").
3See infra notes 39-54.
4See infra notes 73-94.
5See infra notes 56-72.
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traditional case law continues to be applied, and that several cases appear
to turn on that trusty but unglamorous staple of antitrust litigation,
internal documents. Although the Division's poor "won-lost" record is
based on a sample far too small for it to be statistically significant, the
continued vitality of traditional case law may offer a possible partial
explanation of the Division's poor record. FTC and Antitrust Division
briefs show that Division lawyers are somewhat more faithful to the
Division's Merger Guidelines, 6 and less willing to rely on traditional case
law; they also suggest that Division lawyers appear to be relatively more
concerned with shaping the law and relatively less concerned with case
outcomes, as such. Of course, even if the Division's approach has contributed to its relative lack of success, it may not be inferior, since Government prosecutors have a mission that is broader than merely winning
cases.
For ease of reference, a comparison of the Guidelines and traditional
case law precedes the review of merger decisions and the discussion of
the antitrust agencies' approaches to merger litigation.
A.

COMPARISON OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES

AND TRADITIONAL CASE LAW

There are numerous published comparisons of the Guidelines and
traditional case law, 7 and this subsection does not attempt to improve
upon them. Instead, it is intended merely to facilitate the discussion that
follows by offering a reminder of a couple of differences.
According to the Justice Department, "[plerhaps the single most important contribution of the 1982 Guidelines" was their approach to market definition.' Market definition under the 1982 and 1984 Guidelines
is a process of identifying a group of firms that could profitably raise
prices were they replaced by a single firm, and a geographic area within
6 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE MERGER GUIDELINES (1982), 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)

4500

et seq. (June 14, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES]; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE

MERGER GUIDELINES (1984), 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)

4490 et seq. (June 14, 1984)

[hereinafter 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES].

' Two of the best discussions of the Guidelines are Symposium: 1982 Merger Guidelines,
71 CALIF. L. REV. No. 2 (1983), and ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 12,
HORIZONTAL MERGERS: LAW AND POLICY (1986) [hereinafter MERGER MONOGRAPH].

I Department ofJustice Statement (June 14, 1984), reprintedin 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
4490, at 6879-2 ("Market definition has historically played a crucial role in merger analysis;
however, before the 1982 Guidelines, markets often were defined largely on an ad hoc
basis. The 1982 Guidelines developed a general framework for market definition that can
be objectively applied to a myriad of factual circumstances."); see also Baxter, Responding
to the Reaction: The Draftsman'sView, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 618,622 (1983) ("The most innovative
and controversial aspect of the Guidelines is their approach to market definition."); Baker
& Blumenthal, The 1982 Guidelines and PreexistingLaw, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 311, 322 (1984).
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which they could do so. Operationally, the Guidelines explain that the
Division will expand proposed product markets so long as "a significant
percentage of the buyers of products already included would be likely
to shift to those other products in response to a small but significant and
non-transitory increase in price," and will expand proposed geographic
markets to include all firms that "could make significant sales" to customers of previously-included firms "in response to a small but significant
and non-transitory increase in price."9 This is a "foiling" test.
The Guidelines' approach can be contrasted with the leading "traditional" test for product markets, which is provided by Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States:'0
The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the
reasonableinterchangeabilityof use or the cross-elasticity of demand between
the product itself and substitutes for it. However, within this broad
market, well-defined submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes. The boundaries of such a

submarket may be determined by examining such practical indicia as
industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic
entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production
facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes,
and specialized vendors. Because § 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits any
merger which may substantially lessen competition "in any line of commerce" (emphasis supplied), it is necessary to examine the effects of a
merger in each such economically significant submarket to determine
if there is a reasonable probability that the merger will substantially
lessen competition.

In addition to Brown Shoe, the leading Supreme Court cases include United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Cellophane)," United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America (Rome Cable),' United States v. Continental Can
Co.,' 3- and United States v. PhiladelphiaNational Bank. 4
9 1982 GUIDELINES, 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) at 6881-8, 6881-10; see also 1984 GUIDELINES, 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) at 6879-9, 6879-11. The 1982 Guidelines state that the
Division will implement the test by hypothesizing a 5% price increase; and the 1984
Guidelines state that the Division usually will do this. In fact, the Division currently normally
hypothesizes 10% price increases, which had always been the preference of Division economists. Salop, Symposium on Mergers and Antitrust, 1 J. EcoN. PERSPECTIVES 3, 10 (1987);
White, Antitrust and Merger Policy: A Review and Critique, 1 J.EcoN. PERSPECTIVES 13, 15
(1987).
10370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (Warren, Ch. J) (footnotes and citation omitted) (emphasis

added).
11351
12377
"3378
14374

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

377
271
441
321

cases, see ABA
(hereinafter
78.

(1956)
(1964)
(1964)
(1963)

(market not limited to cellophane).
(aluminum cable separate from equally effective copper cable).
(metal cans and glass jars included in same market).
(commercial banking "cluster market"). For a discussion of these

ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS

ANTITRUST

LAw

DEVELOPMENTS);

150-53 (2d ed. 1984)

MERGER MONOGRAPH, supra note 7, at 68-
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The traditional case law's approach to geographic market definition
is ad hoc. The leading case again is Brown Shoe, which said that "Congress
prescribed a pragmatic, factual approach," and that a geographic market
must "both 'correspond to the commercial realities' of the industry and
be economically significant."'" "The proper question to be asked," according to the Court in Philadelphia National Bank, "is . not where the
parties to the merger do business or even where they compete, but where,
within the area of competitive overlap, the effect of the merger on
competition will be direct and immediate."' 6 Finally, the Court in United
States v. Pabst Brewing Co. wrote that the Government need only demonstrate an effect on competition "somewhere in the United States. '"7
In applying the Court's teaching, lower courts have looked at a number
of factors, including customer locations, industry, recognition, pricing
zones and patterns, and patterns of shipments.'"
Although the distinction between the Guidelines' approach .to market
definition and that of traditional case law should not be exaggerated,
since both approaches look to many common factors,' 9 the focus of the
370 U.S. at 336-37 (merger evaluated nationwide and in numerous metropolitan
areas).
6374 U.S. at 357 (market limited to counties in Philadelphia's metropolitan area). Quoting an earlier decision, the Court explained that "the 'area of effective competition .'..
must be charted by careful selection of the market area in which the seller operates, and
to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies'." Id. at 359 (quoting Tampa Elec.
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961)) (emphasis omitted).
17384 U.S. 546, 549 (1966) (adding that the Act "does not call for the delineation of a
,section of the country' by metes and bounds as a surveyor would lay off a plot of ground")
(markets included each of the country, three states, and Wisconsin). Any suggestion that
Pabst makes proof of geographic market unnecessary was rejected in United States v.
Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 621 n.20 (1974), a potential competition case.
1"For discussions of the cases and these factors, see ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS,
supra note 14, at 154-57; MERGER MONOGRAPH, supra note 7, at 82-88, 99-100. A "pattern
of shipments" standard which achieved considerable acceptance, was championed in Elzinga & Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation Revisited: The Case of Coal,
23 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1978); Elzinga & Hogarty, theProblemofGeographicMarketDelineation
in Antimerger Suits, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 45 (1973).
19After setting forth the foiling test, the 1984 Guidelines concede that
[a]lthough evidence of the likely effect of a future price increase may sometimes
be available, it usually will be necessary for the Department to infer the likely
effects of a price increase from various types of reliable, circumstantial evidence .... Thus, in evaluating product substitutability, the 'Department will consider all relevant evidence but will give particular weight to the following factors:
[1]
[2]
[3]
sign,
[4]

Evidence of buyers' perceptions ...;
Differences in the price movements ...
Similarities or differences between the products in customary usage, dephysical composition, and other technical characteristics; and
Evidence of sellers' perceptions ....

1984 GUIDELINES, 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) at 6879-9; see also id. at 6879-11 (in drawing
geographic markets, the Division will "give particular weight" to "shipment patterns,"
"[e]vidence of buyers having actually considered shifting," "[d]ifferences in the price move-
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inquiries are somewhat different.2 ° The difference is exemplified by one
of the central tenets of the Guidelines: the general disavowal of that
over-used prosecutorial drug, the submarket.2 ' The Guidelines presume
that there will be a single market, and explain that "the Department will
consider defining additional, narrower relevant product markets" only
when a hypothetical monopolist could discriminatorily (and profitably)
raise prices to those who "cannot easily substitute away.1 22 As suggested
in the discussion of case law above, traditional case law relied heavily on
submarket analysis.
The Guidelines differ less sharply from traditional case law in their
evaluation of competitive effects, except that the Guidelines use a different measure of concentration.2 ' Again the major change is one of
focus. Traditional case law is generally hostile to increases in concentration, for a variety of social and economic reasons. Mergers were condemned principally on the basis of market shares, concentration, and,
frequently, trends in concentration, in such leading cases as Brown Shoe,
Alcoa (Rome Cable), Pabst Brewing, PhiladelphiaNational Bank, and Von's
Grocery. Several of these opinions stated that Section 7 of the Clayton
Act was intended "to arrest anticompetitive tendencies in their 'incipiency. "24

In contrast to traditional case law's more amorphous concerns about
concentration, the Guidelines focus more sharply on the prevention of
ments," "[t]ransportation costs," "[closts of local distribution," and "[e]xcess capacity.");
Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftsman's View, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 618, 624 (1983)
("[ilt will of course be true that available data may not allow a direct determination of
whether a significant, nontransitory increase in price would be profitable. However, where
such data are not available, there is at least a theoretical framework for analyzing the
relevance of indirect or second-best evidence.").
Several of the factors listed in the Guidelines are found, or have parallels, in the Brown
Shoe factors quoted above. The factors listed by the 1982 and 1984 Guidelines are identical
except that only the 1984 Guidelines refer to shipment patterns, and the 1982 Guidelines
did not include the frank recognition that it will not usually be possible directly to apply
the Guidelines' test. 1982 GUIDELINES, 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) at 6881-8, 6881-10.
21See Werden, Market Delineation and the Justice Department'sMerger Guidelines, 1983 DUKE
L.J. 514, 575 ("The Guidelines reflect a preference for a theoretically correct approach,
logically derived from the ultimate goal of merger enforcement, over the simplicity of
Brown Shoe.").
"' See, e.g., PanelDiscussion: The New Merger Guidelines, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 317, 320 (1982)
(comments of Assistant Attorney General Baxter) ("the Brown Shoe concept of submarkets
has been terribly abused," and "the sooner we see the end of that kind of chatter the
better"); Werden, supra note 20, at 574-75. A good discussion of submarkets is ificluded

in MERGER

MONOGRAPH,

supra note 7, at 128-31.

1984 GUIDELINES, 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) at 6879-9 to 6879-10.
2' See Calkins, The New Merger Guidelines and the Herfindahl-HirschmanIndex, 71 CALIF. L.
REv. 402 (1983).
24E.g., Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. at 278 (quoting PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 362).
2
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collusion.2 5 Principal attention is given to market shares and concentration, but the Division also will consider ease of entry and a number of
other factors that "relate to the ease and profitability of collusion."2 6 The
1984 Guidelines expanded the number of these factors and made clear
that the Division "will not challenge mergers solely on the basis of concentration and market share data without considering other relevant
factors. '27 The Guidelines deliberately refrain from mentioning concen2
tration trends. 1
On the same day the 1982 Guidelines were issued, the Federal Trade
Commission released its Statement Concerning Horizontal Mergers.2 9 In
this Statement, the FTC generally endorsed the Guidelines, declaring
that they would be "given considerable weight by the Commission and
its staff."' 0 The approach the Commission would take, as described by
21

1982

GUIDELINES,

2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)

4501 (June 14, 1982):

The unifying theme of the Guidelines is that mergers should not be permitted
to create or enhance "market power" or to facilitate its exercise.... Where only
a few firms account for most of the sales of a product, those firms can in some
circumstances coordinate, explicitly or implicitly, their actions in order to approximate the performance of a monopolist. This ability of one or more firms
profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant period of
time is termed "market power."
See also Department of Justice Explanation and Summary, reprinted id. at 4500 ("The
purpose of the guidelines is to prevent the monopolization or cartelization-control by
one or by several firms-of any significant economic markets."); Panel Discussion, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 31, 33 (1985) (comments of William Baxter) ("The criteria that show up in the
Merger Guidelines represent a sort of prophylactic approach to conspiratorial collusion.");
Baker & Blumenthal, supra note 8, at 316 ("Under the Guidelines, the likelihood of enforcement is tied to the extent that the risk of collusion is significantly enhanced by a
particular merger .... Unlike the 1960's cases, . . . the Guidelines view concentration as
mattering not for its own sake, but only because it increases the likelihood of collusion.").
See generally Hospital Corp. of Am. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th
Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) ("When an economic approach is taken in a section 7 case, the
ultimate issue is whether the challenged acquisition is likely to facilitate collusion."), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1975 (1987); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
102 (1976) ("The real significance of concentration, which is obscured by the term 'market
power' ... is that it facilitates collusion, explicit or tacit, among the firms in the market
by reducing the costs of collusion and of detecting cheating.").
The Guidelines also contain a "leading firm proviso," applicable when a party to a merger
has a market share of at least 35% that is twice as great as that possessed by the next largest
firm; this proviso responds to a concern about mergers that may create or enhance single-

firm market power. 1984 GUIDELINES at 6879-14; 1982 GUIDELINES at 6881-13.
26 1984 GUIDELINES at 6879-16; 1982 GUIDELINES at 6881-13.
27Department of Justice Statement, supra note 8, at 6879-83.
28Kauper, supra note 2, at 515 n.43. As Professor Kauper notes, few commentators
regard such trends as a proper consideration (and they note that, if they are to be con-

sidered, they could cut either way). See, e.g., P.

AREEDA

& H.

HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW

914 (Supp. 1986).
92 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4516 (June 14, 1982) [hereinafter FTC Statement].
oId. at 6901. According to a (then) associate director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition,
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its Statement, is similar but not identical to that of the Guidelines. (An
important difference between the FTC Statement and the Guidelines is
one of tone: the FTC Statement cites numerous cases and secondary
sources; the Guidelines cites none.) For product market definition, the
Statement uses a cross-elasticity (of demand and supply) test,"1 although
it also seems to approve of a foiling approach such as that used by the
Guidelines;12 for geographic market definition, it uses a Guidelines-like
foiling approach.3 3 For both product and geographic market definition,
34
the Statement lists a number of specific relevant factors to be considered.
5
Submarkets are not mentioned.
FTC staff evaluating mergers apply both the 1984 Guidelines and the FTC Statement,
which he views as "entirely consistent." McCarty, MergerPolicy and Enforcement at the Federal
Trade Commission: The Lawyer's View, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 103, 106 (1985).
112 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) at 6901-6 ("Where the cross-elasticity of demand for separate
products or services is high, they normally will be within the same product market. Similarly,
a high cross-elasticity of supply tends to suggest the existence of a common product
market."); cf. Grand Union Co., 102 F.T.C. 812, 1038-41 (1983) (Miller, Ch.) (markets
ideally would be defined by supply and demand elasticity and cross-elasticity, although
information to compute these accurately usually will be lacking); Weyerhaeuser Co., 106
F.T.C. 172, 273-75 (1985) (same).
" 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) at 6901-6. ("the issue of whether related products or services
place a significant constraint on the ability of merging firms to raise prices, limit supply
or lower quality is central to evaluating the competitive effects of a horizontal merger").
For a good comparison of the cross-elasticity test and the Guidelines' "hypothetical monopolist" test, see MERGER MONOGRAPH, supra note 7, at 90-96, 105-10.
33Id. at 6901-7 ("[T]he issue is whether producers of the merged firm's product in other
geographic areas place a significant constraint on the ability of the merged firm to raise
price or restrict output. As a general proposition, an area is a separate geographic market
if a change in the price of the product in that area does not, within a relevant period of
time, induce substantial changes in the quantity of the product sold in other areas."); cf.,
e.g., Grand Union Co., 102 F.T.C. 812, 1047 (1983) ("the area within which sellers of the
product(s) sold by the merged firm place a significant constraint on the merged firm's
ability to raise prices").
2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) at 6901-6:
[T]he existence of separate product markets may be evidenced by: the persistence
of sizeable price disparities for equivalent amounts of different products; the
presence of sufficiently distinctive characteristics which render a product suitable
only for a specialized use; the preference of a number of purchasers who traditionally use only a particular kind of product for a distinct use; or the judgment
of purchasers or sellers as to whether products are in fact competitive.
Id. at 6901-7:
The Commission will consider the following factors relevant to this [geographic
market] determination: the relationship between price and quantity ... ; barriers
to trade flows, e.g., high transportation costs, time required to make deliveries or
municipal, state or federal regulation; and shipping patterns .... Evidence of
shipments may be particularly probative when it reflects long-held patterns of
trade and industry perceptions.
s No discussion of submarkets, as such, can be found in recent FTC opinions, even
where the term is used in the complaint and initial decision. See, e.g., Grand Union Co.,
102 F.T.C. 812 (1983). However, in American Medical Int'l, Inc., the Commission approved
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The FTC Statement's discussion of competitive effect shares the Guidelines' central concern with collusion. 6 The Statement differs from the
Guidelines-particularly the 1982 Guidelines-in that it calls for consideration of numerous "qualitative factors" that may influence the ability
of firms to collude or otherwise exercise market power. 7 One of these
factors is "concentration trends (including the volatility of market
shares)." 8
B.

ANTITRUST DIVISION CASES

Under the leadership of Assistant Attorney General William Baxter
and his successors, the Antitrust Division has won only one reported
merger decision-and that was a case in which the defendants did not
introduce "any substantial evidence."39 To be sure, the Division has enan administrative law judge's finding of two markets, one a county and one a city within
that county, which the Commission described as a "narrower geographic market definition."
104 F.T.C. 1, 196 (1984).
' FTC Statement, 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) at 6901-2 ("Legal analysis of horizontal
mergers, however, has focused on the extent to which these mergers confer market power
on the acquiring firm or enhance the ability of firms to collude, either expressly or tacitly.").
'7 See also American Medical Int'l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1, 200 (1984) (Calvani, Comm'r):
[A]lthough market share evidence is an important starting point in merger analysis,
it alone is not conclusive in determining the legality of a merger under Section 7.
... Although the Commission has expressed an intent to give "considerable
weight" to the Justice Guidelines, it has not endorsed either the analytical approach
or the numerical thresholds and tests for analyzing mergers contained in the'
Justice Guidelines. More importantly, the Commission emphasizes certain "qualitative" factors over strict "quantitative" industry concentration measures.
3 FTC Statement at 6901-3. However, recent FTC decisions have given almost no attention
to concentration trends, even where initial decisions have treated them seriously. See, e.g.,
Weyerhaeuser Co., 106 F.T.C. 172 (1985); American Medical Int'l, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1
(1984). But cf. Champion Spark Plug Co., 103 F.T.C. 546, 628 (1984) (initial decision
adopted as opinion of Commission) (discussing deconcentration trend); Beatrice Foods
Co., 101 F.T.C. 733, 824 (1983) (Pertschuk, Comm'r) (discussing deconcentration trend).
'9 United States v. Rice Growers Ass'n, 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
67,288, at 61,465
(E.D.Cal.), motion for reconsiderationdenied, 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,287, at 61,458
(E.D. Cal. 1986). My tabulation does not count as a "win" the Ninth Circuit's vacating a
dismissal of a merger case on grounds of government attorney misconduct (but upholding
award of monetary sanctions), United States v. National Medical Enter., Inc., 792 F.2d
906 (9th Cir. 1986). Cf. United States v. National Medical Enter., Inc., 1987-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 67,640 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (consent decree limited to ten-year ban on acquisitions
without approval). It also does not count the hold separate order won in United States v.
Acorn Eng'g Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,197 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 1981)-like Rice
Growers, by lawyers from the Division's San Francisco office. The case had been filed in
August, 1980, and the hearing was held on May 4, 1981, so it is unlikely that the new
leadership in Washington substantially contributed to the trial strategy (Assistant Attorney
General Baxter was confirmed by the Senate on March 26). The opinion's substantive
discussion is devoted almost exclusively to market definition ("vandal-resistant (stainless
steel and aluminum) plumbing fixtures"), and accepted a government argument that it
described as exclusively based on traditional Brown Shoe factors.
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tered into numerous settlements, 40 but whether or not these are "wins"
is inevitably moot since lawyers on both sides of settlements frequently
claim victory-indeed, one of the allures of settlement is that it permits
this. What is clear is that when the Division has litigated merger cases
recently, it has generally been unsuccessful.4' The number of cases is so
small that nothing is proven by this, but it raises intriguing questions,
some of which are discussed below.
The Division lost two cases when the court found ease of entry.42 In
United States v. Waste Management, Inc.," the court of appeals reversed
the district court and upheld a merger creating a firm with a 49 percent
market share.44 The court rested its decision on ease of entry, explicitly
relying on the Guidelines: "If the Department of Justice routinely considers ease of entry as relevant to determining the competitive impact
of a merger, it may not argue to a court addressing the same issue that
46
ease of entry is irrelevant. 45 Similarly, in United States v. Calmar, Inc.,
"o For reviews of recent settlements, see Prager, How Much is Enough? Antitrust Developments
Affecting Mergers and Acquisitions, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 303, 321-31 (1987). For commentary
on what I have referred to as "the transformation of merger antitrust practice into an
agency negotiation specialty," see Briggs & Calkins, Antitrust 1986-87: Power and Access
(Part1), 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 275, 303 (1987), see Jorde, Restoring Predictabilityto Merger
Guideline Analysis, 4 CONTEMP. POLICY ISSUES 1 (1986) (expressing concern); Sullivan, The
Antitrust Division as a Regulatory Agency: An Enforcement Policy in Transition, 64 WASH. U.L.Q.
997 (1986) (celebrating the development); and D. Baker, Today's Antitrust Enforcement-A
PartialDissent (Nov. 14, 1986) (prepared for the 20th Annual New England Antitrust
Conference, Cambridge, Mass.) (expressing reservations).
4'Accord G. Werden, Market Delineation under the NAAG Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Realities or Illusions?, at 8 (unpublished manuscript 1987).
4'For a discussion of ease of entry, see Schmalensee, Ease of Entry: Has the Concept Been

Applied Too Readily?, 56

ANTITRUST

L.J. 41 (1987).

43743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984).
44Id. at 981.

Id. at 983. The Division had argued as follows:
While high "entry barriers amplify the anticompetitive price effects caused by
seller concentration," this does not mean that a merger which produces a 50
percent aggregate share of the merged firms in a concentrated market is legal if
entry barriers are low. At bottom, ease of entry is but one of a number of structural
factors relevant to the likely competitive impact of a merger ....
DO] Waste Management Appeal Brief at 49 (citations and footnote omitted). For Division
reaction, see Leddy, Entry Issues in Merger Analysis, 54 Antitrust L.J. 1257, 1258-59 (1986)
(Second Circuit misunderstood entry issue and improperly engaged in fact-finding). The
surprising nature of the result is suggested by the minimal attention given to the entry
issue in the briefs, see DOJ Waste ManagementAppeal Brief at 49-51, Brief of DefendantsAppellants at 41-46, Waste Management, and at oral argument, see letter from Patrick J.
Roach to Stephen Calkins at 1 (Oct. 19, 1987) ("One of the ironies of the case is that, to
my recollection, the entry issue was not addressed by either side at oral argument in the
Second Circuit.").
' 612 F. Supp. 1298 (D.N.J. 1985).
15
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the court upheld a merger creating a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
("HHI") of over 3,000 principally because entry was easy.47
The other basis on which the Antitrust Division has lost cases has been
market definition. (The Division also lost market definition issues in Waste
Management and Calmar,48 and, in the single litigated Division victory,
United States v. Rice Growers Ass'n,49 two of the Division's three proposed
markets were rejected.) In two small bank merger cases, United States v.
Virginia NationalBankshares, Inc.5° and United States v. CentralState Bank,5
the Department lost on grounds of geographic market definition. In the
first case, the court ruled that banks in small towns seven miles apart
were in separate geographic markets;12 in the second, the court ruled
that banks in a regional center 32 to 40 miles away from two small towns
were in the same geographic market as banks in those towns.53 Finally,
in an unreported case currently on appeal, United States v. Archer-DanielsMidland Co., 4 the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment solely on the basis of market definition, ruling that the
product market for evaluating the competitive effect of a combination
612 F. Supp. at 1305-07 (court was particularly impressed with the ability of major
purchaser of pumps to integrate backward).
" Waste Management, 588 F. Supp. at 502 (rejecting the Government's proposed markets-trash collection by "front-load" trucks, and trash collection by "roll-off containers"and the defendants'-all trash collection-and defined the market as "trash collection
from commercial establishments"); Calmar,612 F. Supp. at 1303-05 (rejecting Government
attempt to separate "regular dispensers" from "regular sprayers," and defendants' attempt
to include aerosol valves and flip top closures). In Waste Management, the Government
prevailed on a hotly disputed geographic market issue, when the court excluded Fort
Worth from the Dallas market. 588 F. Supp. at 503-04.
191986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,288, at 61,465 (E.D. Cal. 1986), motion for reconsideration
denied, 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,287 (E.D. Cal. 1986).
501982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,871 (W.D. Va. 1982).
5'817 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1987).
5 Plaintiff's Pretrial Brief at 22, Virginia National Bankshares (Civ. No. 82-0083B). The
court based its opinion primarily on the testimony of local bankers, who testified that
people like to bank locally and that travel between the two towns can be difficult in winter.
1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)at 72,352-53. The court added that the Division had failed to
make out a case "under the traditional [market definition] standards that are set forth by
...the Supreme Court in the various cases, or under some economic standard that has
not yet been defined." Id. at 72,351.
" United States v. Central State Bank, 621 F. Supp. 1276, 1281 (W.D. Mich. 1985), aff'd,
817 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1987).
14Civ. No. 83-51-D (D. Iowa May 29, 1987), appeal noticed, No. 87-2343-SI (8th Cir. Oct.
1, 1987). While associated with Covington & Burling, I worked on the preliminary stages
of this proceeding. This paper is not based on anything other than publicly available briefs
and opinions, and it does not express, nor should it be read as expressing, any opinion
on the merits of any decision in the proceeding.
Archer-Daniels-Midland is the only unreported merger opinion in a case brought by the
Reagan Administration of which I am aware.
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of high fructose corn sweetener businesses included at least sucrose
(which ruling, all agreed, determined the outcome of the litigation).
C. PRIVATE CASES

Why has the Division been so unsuccessful? Is it simply that it is difficult
to win merger cases? Although some have argued this,5 the experience
of private litigants and the FTC suggests otherwise. The FTC's experience is discussed below. In cases brought by private parties and decided
since the Guidelines were issued, plaintiffs have won about half the
substantive decisions.-6 Several of these cases followed federal agency

11E.g., PanelDiscussion:CounselingYour Client on Monopolization,Mergers,andjoint Ventures,
55 ANTITRUST L.J. 321, 329 (1986) (comments of Mark Leddy):
There is simply less confidence in the presumption that concentration automatically means poor performance. The "other factors," entry being predominant,
have made the scrutiny of an acquisition into a kind of rule of reason inquiry
that seeks to determine whether or not the effect of the transaction will be to
lower output.
That, in turn, has made the bringing and winning of these cases very difficult.
Others might suggest that the Guidelines have clarified the law, as a consequence of
which very troubling mergers (i.e., easy Government cases) are not attempted. This is
simply not true, as any lawyer actively practicing in the area will attest, given confidentiality.
To be sure, advocates are prone to exaggerate their triumphs, but simply noting a few of
the litigated cases gives the lie to any such claim. For instance, in a discussion of Federal
Trade Comm'n v. Warner Communications Inc., 742 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1984), Federal
Trade Comm'n v. Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1986), vacated without opinion,
829 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1987), and United States v. LTV Corp., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,133 (D.D.C. 1984) (consent judgment), Assistant Attorney General Baxter's chief
economist wrote that "if the enforcement agencies had not brought these actions, one
might have concluded Section 7 had been effectively repealed." White, supra note 9, at 19
(noting that he was an expert witness for the FTC in Coca-Cola).
This includes only reported decisions in which the substantive § 7 count predominates,
and excludes those decided on procedural grounds (e.g., standing). Obviously, the results
would differ were standing cases included. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc.,
107 S. Ct. 484 (1986) (denying standing); Alberta Gas Chems. Ltd. v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 826 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1987) (same); O'Neill v. Coca-Cola Co., 669 F.
Supp. 217 (N.D. I11.1987) (same). But cf. Cia. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean,
Inc., 754 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1985) (standing found). For a review of recent standing cases,
see Kolasky, MergerEnforcement by States and PrivateParties,56 ANTITRUST L.J. 839 (1988).
Cases excluded because the substantive merger count did not appear to predominate
include the $5 million verdict for monopolization by merger in Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E.
Johnson Co., Dkt. C 76-425 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 2, 1986), and the following: Cine 42nd Street
Theater Corp. v. Nederlander Org., Inc., 790 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1986) (state action
immunity); North Carolina ex rel Edmisten v. P.I.A. Asheville, Inc., 740 F.2d 274 (4th
Cir. 1984) (state action), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1865 (1985); Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc.
v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 737 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1984) (affirming summary judgment in
franchise case including § 7 count where no market data had been introduced); Sun
Newspapers, Inc. v. Omaha World-Herald Co., 713 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1983) (affirming
injunction where newspaper's purchase of printer probably was illegal extension of monopoly); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 1360, 1461 (D. Kan. 1987)
(fourth count of "defensive ploy" counterclaim); Kerasotes Michigan Theatres, Inc. v.
National Amusements, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 1514 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (in what was a monop-
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"clearance" of the merger (and some featured opinions declining to defer
to that clearance).
Typical of these cases is the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Monfort of
Colorado, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 7 which theSupreme Court later reversed
for want of standing. The Tenth Circuit's decision on the merits turned
on market definition: the court found a violation because it approved a
"submarket" that consisted of "boxed beef" and excluded imports and
captive consumption, " The district court had based that finding on the
directive of traditional merger cases "to consider the functional and
reasonable interchangeability of the products, the cross-elasticity of demand for the products, and the interchangeability of the products' production facilities."59 The court of appeals expressly rejected the Guidelines'
approach to market definition: "We agree with the district court'sdecision
not to rely on these Guidelines. On the issue of market definition; a
decision based on these guidelines remains as inexact as the data gathered
to make the assessment .... [t]hese Guidelines are more useful for setting
prosecutorial policy than delineating judicial standards."6
Another court gave a ringing rebuff to the. Antitrust Division's view
of the law and condemned a merger principally by means of market
olization case, only possibly viable merger theory was "potential competition," and neither
theory nor facts supporting theory were ever pled); Markel v. Scovill Mfg. Co., 657 F.
Supp. 1102 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (takeover case in which securities issue predominated; no
evidence to support antitrust (conspiracy and merger) charges); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Bachman
Co., 659 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (in Sherman-Act-based counterclaim, § 7 charge
was dismissed because allocation of shelf space does not violate § 7); T.N. Dickinson Co.
v. LL Corp., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,777 (D. Conn. 1985) (trademark suit); St.
Jude
Medical,
Inc.
v.
Intermedics,
Inc.,
1985-1
Trade
Cas.
(CCH)
66,623 (D. Minn. 1985) (third count of counterclaim principally alleging breach of contract
and illegal misappropriation was dismissed because § 7 does not reach acquisitions of
partnership assets); L.J. Dreiling Motor Co. v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 605 F. Supp.
597 (D. Colo. 1985) (granting summary judgment for defendants in dealer termination
case that included a § 7 count unsupported by evidence of competition between the merging
parties); Lynch Bus. Machines, Inc. v. A.B. Dick Co., 594 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1984)
(dealer termination case); Kuykendall Corp. v. Arkla, Inc., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
$ 65,445.(E.D. Ark. 1983) (defense motion for summary judgment denied in monopolization/merger case where plaintiff had not been able to conduct "meaningful discovery");
MLC, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,351 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(summary judgment granted for defendants on monopolization count and secondary. § 7
count).
57761 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1985), reversedfor want of standing, 107 S. Ct. 484 (1986).
58761 F.2d at 578. In addition to the high resulting market shares, the Tenth Circuit
approved the trial court's finding of high entry barriers because it would take "twelve to
eighteen months" and cost $20 to $40 million to build an integrated plant, profit margins
were low, and there were 'psychological' barriers to entry." Id. at 579.
" Monfort, 591 F. Supp. 683, 697 (D. Colo. 1983) (citing, e.g., Brown Shoe and du Pont
(Cellophane)).
60 761 F.2d at 579 (citation omitted).
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definition in Laidlaw Acquisition Corp. v. Mayflower Group, Inc.61 The court
delimited a "submarket" consisting of private bus contracting, relying
on an expert witness, one of the defendant's internal documents, and
Brown Shoe,6 2 and, relying on Pabst Brewing, identified three narrow geographic markets: the Pacific Northwest, Alaska, and California.6" To the
plea that both antitrust agencies had declined to challenge the acquisition,
the court responded as follows:
The agency's opinion of a merger is not binding on this Court, and
their enforcement decisions do not necessarily reflect the current state
of antitrust law.... [Plerhaps the best response to the argument that
the Attorney General, rather than the Supreme Court, is the final authority on the meaning of the antitrust laws, is set out in the appendix
to the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Pabst. We suggest
that it should be required reading for every judge who wants to put his
own gloss on the simple language of Section 7.6

Justice Douglas's Pabst appendix reprints an Art Buchwald column caricaturing lax antitrust enforcement by ostensibly justifying the merger
of the nation's last two firms.
As did Monfort and Laidlaw, the Tasty Cake case 65 turned on a narrow
product market definition, namely, "snack cakes and pies," which consists
largely of such delicacies as Hostess Twinkies, Drake Ring Dings, and
Tasty Cake Krimpets, and narrow definitions of geographic markets and
submarkets (Boston, New York, Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, New
England, and the Mid-Atlantic states), after which it was easy to find a
61636 F. Supp. 1513 (S.D. Ind. 1986). In addition to high market shares, the court found
what it considered "significant barriers to entry" in the form of the cost of insurance, the
length of the contracts (3-5 years), performance bond requirements, and experience
requirements in bid specifications. Id. at 1520.
2The court was persuaded that "school districts rarely, if ever, return to public school
bus transportation once they have 'gone private,'" and, even if they could, their ability to
do so only imposed "an undefined ceiling" on the pricing discretion of private contractors.
636 F. Supp. at 1519.
13636 F. Supp. at 1519-20:
Actually, "Congress did not seem to be troubled about the exact spot where
competition might be lessened; it simply intended to outlaw mergers which threatened competition in any or all parts of the country." United States v. PabstBrewing
Co., 384 U.S. 546,549 (1966). Establishing where the anticompetitive effect exists
geographically is "entirely subsidiary to the crucial question in this and every § 7
case which is whether a merger may substantially lessen competition anywhere
in the United States." Id. at 550.
... It is obvious that these areas [the Pacific Northwest, Alaska, and California]
are those in which Mayflower and Laidlaw presently have their competitive overlap
and where the effect on competition of their merger would be direct and immediate.
'4636 F. Supp. at 1521 (citation omitted).

6 Tasty

Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc., 653 F. Supp 1250 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
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substantive violation. 66 The court's market definition rested on testimony,
documentary evidence, and the apparent practice of the parties to price
against each other.6"
A California district court showed greater deference to the Justice
Department in McCaw PersonalCommunications, Inc. v. Pacific Telesis Group,6"
but the court nonetheless declined to grant a defense motion for summary judgment. Apparently the Justice Department had been persuaded
that entry into the beeper industry was easy, so that high market shares
were not a matter of concern. The court was not convinced, because the
incumbents' beeper frequencies provided quality and cost advantages.
Previous Justice Department approval also was insufficient to prevent
condemnation of G. Heileman Brewing Co.'s proposed acquisition of
Pabst Brewing Co. in ChristianSchmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing
Co. 69 Although the Justice Department had approved the transaction, as
somewhat restructured, 7° the district court and the court of appeals relied
on Pabst Brewing to define a 12-state upper Midwest region in which
6 For discussion of the courts' willingness to find antitrust standing, in spite of Cargill,
Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 484 (1986), see Kolasky, supra note 56, at 84447; Briggs & Calkins, Antitrust 1986-87: Power and Access (PartI1), 32 ANTITRUST BULL.
699, 715-16 (1987).
67The documents produced in Tasty Cake are striking evidence of hostile intentions. In
a memorandum recording a meeting with the chairman of Ralston's then-new subsidiary,
Continental Baking Co., Ralston's vice-president for consumer products business development "wrote that acquisitions were needed to '[tiake competition out.'" 653 F. Supp.
at 1271. A letter between these two individuals promoted the purchase of McKee Baking
Company, a less prominent manufacturer of "snack cakes and pies," as likely to contribute
to "the '[a]bility to control pricing in a basically non-competitive atmosphere.' "Id. at 1271.
Other evidence showed that Continental Baking's "[b]read strategy is to take competition
out and then increase price.' " Id.
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the opinion is that the trial court continued by
writing that the "most telling evidence of an illegal specific intent comes not from any
discovered documents, however, but from the non-discovery of any documents wherein
defendants considered the antitrust consequences of the Drake deal." Id. at 1272. The
court reasoned that the absence of such documents suggested either that the transaction
was so clearly illegal that it was unnecessary to analyze it, or they had destroyed the records,
either of which would have demonstrated illegal intent. Id. at 1272. The court is clearly
misinformed, since numerous documents analyzing such a transaction could have been
protected by the attorney-client privilege, and not all discovered documents are submitted
to the court, so that analyses of the merger could have been produced but not brought
to the Court's attention. Cf Brief for Appellants, Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc.,
Nos. 87-1091, 87-1132 (3d Cir., brief filed Apr. 15, 1987), at 21 n.* (An analysis prepared
for the antitrust agencies had been produced to plaintiffs who had not filed it with the
Court.)
68645 F. Supp. 1166 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
69600 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1354 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 105 S.
Ct. 1155 (1985).
70 United States v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,399 (D.
Del. 1983) (consent judgment).
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concentration levels were sufficiently high to be of concern. Again, plaintiffs won on market definition grounds.7
In short, private parties have achieved notable success in winning
merger cases" during the same time period in which the Division has
had little success in challenging mergers it presumably regarded as more
troubling. The opinions in these printed cases are quite traditional, relying on settled precedents (particularly for defining markets) rather
than the Guidelines.
D.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION CASES

The Federal Trade Commission has won five of the six reported district
court merger cases filed since Chairman James Miller assumed office at
" Private plaintiffs also won at least a nominal victory in White Consolidated Indus.,
Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 612 F. Supp. 1009 (N.D. Ohio), vacated, 619 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D.
Ohio 1985), aff'd, 781 F.2d 1224 (6th Cir. 1986). Although the FTC did not object to the
transaction, given a certain amount of restructuring, the court was not persuaded that
competition would be protected. After additional restructuring, the court lifted its injunction. The most persuasive exposition of the plaintiffs' position is 0. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust (remarks presented at The Antitrust Policy Institute's Conference on
the Antitrust Alternative (Mar. 27, 1987).
The Northern District of Ohio also decided one of the early and celebrated successful
private challenges to a merger that apparently did not trouble the antitrust agency. See
Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp. 530 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 669 F.2d 378 (6th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982).
2 Cf. Mr. Frank, Inc. v. Waste Management, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ill. 1984)
(motion to dismiss § 7 count denied; creditor relationship could provide sufficient control
to implicate § 7). But see Cable Holdings, Inc. v. Home Video, Inc., 825 F.2d 1559 (11 th
Cir. 1987) (affirming district court's upholding ofjury verdict for defendant cable television
companies, because it was not clearly erroneous for jury to define market as including all
"passive visual entertainment"); Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 592 F. Supp.
203 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (denying preliminary injunction sought by target firm where acquiring firm was not yet a viable competitor in relevant market and competitiveness of
market prevented application of potential competition doctrine); Joseph Ciccone & Sons,
Inc. v. Eastern Indus., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (defendant prevailed where
plaintiff's case centered on an expert's testimony that was rejected as totally flawed); ChemNuclear Sys., Inc. v. Waste Management, Inc., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,860 (W.D.
Wash. 1982) (denying target firm preliminary injunction where it and raiding firm were
found to be separate geographic markets); cf. Midcon Corp. v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc.,
625 F. Supp. 1475 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (preliminary injunction denied where target made no
showing that competition would be harmed were acquiring firm to require it to purchase
high priced natural gas); Frank Saltz & Sons, Inc. v. Hart Schaffner & Marx, 1985-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 66,768 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (dismissing challenge to Hart Schaffner & Marx's
acquisition of the Pierre Cardin license principally because plaintiff, a contract suit manufacturer, lacked standing, but also because post-merger HHI was only 884, entry was
easy, and demand and supply substitutability defeated plaintiff's attempt to define a market
consisting of "better quality" suits); Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v. The Limited, Inc.,
587 F. Supp. 246 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (dismissing target company's challenge to tender offer
for want of standing, and denying preliminary injunction where demand and supply
substitutability prevented plaintiff from establishing market consisting of "moderate-priced
women's fashion apparel" and "special-sized women's apparel" sold in those shopping malls
where plaintiff and defendant both had stores).
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the end of September, 1981, and the Commission prevailed in the only
73
appeal from the merger opinions it issued during that time period.
The cases are significant in part for their continued reliance on traditional
case law. The cases are intriguing because, with some exceptions, Commission lawyers have invited this reliance.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Warner Communications Inc. ,7 the trial
court denied the FTC's application for an injunction against the formation of a joint venture that effectively would have merged two businesses. 75 The trial court, apparently inspired by the Guidelines' central
'
concern with the effect of mergers on the likelihood of "collusion, 76
denied an injunction because it found that collusion was unlikely. 77 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, specifically rejecting the trial court's
approach: "Since Section 7 required only a showing of reasonable probability of anticompetitive effect and the district court required a showing
of collusion, we conclude that the court applied an incorrect legal standard." 78 The court went on to accept the FTC's proposed product market
(prerecorded music, which excludes "home taping") based on Brown Shoe
factors, and to enjoin the venture because it found moderate concentration, a trend toward increased concentration, and barriers to entry
79
such as high capital costs and the need for special expertise.
" In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see Federal Trade Comm'n v. Pacific
Resources, Inc., No. C-87-1390 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 6, 1987) (granting preliminary injunction); the case is counted as "reported" because it should be reported shortly. The only
defeat among the reviewed cases was Federal Trade Comm'n v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,071 (D.D.C. 1986) (preliminary injunction denied
where entry was easy and price competition was vigorous).
At the Commission level, complaint counsel have been notably less successful, prevailing
in only 30% of the merger decisions reported since Chairman Miller took office. Compare
Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361 (1985) (requiring divestiture), aff'd, 807 F.2nd
1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1975 (1987); American Medical Int'l, Inc., 104
F.T.C. 1 (1984) (same), modified, [1983-1987 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
22,342 (Mar. 21, 1986) and Olin Corp., Dkt. 9196 (FTC initial decision Dec. 17, 1987)
(same), noted in 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 22,496, with Weyerhaeuser Co., 106 F.T.C.
172 (1985) (dismissing complaint); Echlin Mfg. Co., 105 F.T.C. 410 (1985) (same); B.A.T.
Indus., Ltd., 104 F.T.C. 852 (1984) (same); Grand Union Co., 102 F.T.C. 812 (1983)
(same); Beatrice Foods Co., 101 F.T.C. 733 (1983) (Pertschuk, Comm'r) (same); Champion
Spark Plug Co., 103 F.T.C. 546 (1984) (same); B.F. Goodrich Co., Dkt. No. 9159 (FTC
initial decision Sept. 24, 1985) (challenge to horizontal merger dismissed where competition
found to be vigorous), noted in [1983-1987 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
22,294.
74 742 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1984).
7' Federal Trade Comm'n v. Warner Communications Inc., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,025 (C.D. Cal.), rev'd, 742 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
76 See text accompanying notes 25-28, supra.
77 742 F.2d at 1160 (summarizing trial court's findings and conclusion, which are not
reported).
71 742 F.2d at 1160.
79 742 F.2d at 1163-64. The Ninth Circuit also ruled that it was error for the trial court
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One of the FTC's most recent successful injunction efforts featured
even more striking reliance on traditional case law. In Federal Trade
Commission v. Coca-Cola Co.,"0 Judge Gesell relied on the submarket concept to define both a national and a regional geographic market (the
South and Southwest United States), and accepted the FTC's proposed
product market, carbonated soft drink products. 8 ' However, he ruled
that the FTC had failed to establish the factual basis for what he perceived
to be its principal theory of illegality, namely, that the merger would
lessen the vigor of competition between Coca-Cola Co. and Pepsi Co.82
Thus, the FTC's collusion-based argument was unsuccessful. Nonetheless, the court condemned the merger on traditional grounds, in strong
language:
Section 7 of the Clayton Act was not designed to support a particular
economic theory; it was directed at what Congress in the exercise of its
own common sense perceived.... given this dominant legislative desire
to curb the economic concentration of power, it is unnecessary to speculate about the economic effect of the proposed acquisition. Without
more, substantial mergers of this kind in heavily concentrated industries
are presumed illegal. 3
In a conclusion reminiscent of that written by the Laidlaw court, Judge
Gesell wrote as follows:
Any federal judge considering regulatory aims such as those laid down
by Congress in Section 7 of the Clayton Act should hesitate before
grafting onto the Act an untried economic theory such as the wealthmaximization and efficiency-through-acquisition doctrine expounded
by Coca-Cola Company.... Surely Congress had a variety of considerations in mind when it enacted the major public policy enunciated by
this Section. There were concerns about size as such, about opportunity
for small business, about concentration trends; there was also a belief
that a diversified competitive market assures a healthy economy and
encourages innovation. To be sure, efficiencies that benefit consumers
were recognized as desirable but they were to be developed by dominant
concerns using their brains, not their money by buying out troubling
to consider and rely on an internal memorandum by the FTC's Bureau of Economics. Id.
at 1160-62.
"641 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1986), vacatedwithout opinion, 829 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
641 F. Supp. 1132-33.
812641 F. Supp. at 1138. Although the FTC's oral presentations may have focused on
collusion, its brief also included more traditional arguments. See infra notes 115, 117.
11Id. at 1138. Judge Gesell rejected Coca-Cola's argument that its output would expand
after the merger (thus assertedly proving that it would not lessen competition and raise
prices) as proving "too much":
The inherent ability of a dominant company in a heavily concentrated industry
to expand its sales after eliminating a competitor from the market and acquiring
its products cannot justify a presumptively illegal acquisition. [citingJustice Douglas's concurring opinion in PabstBrewing] Wider sales of a soft drink by eliminating
competition is not a benefit which Section 7 affords to dominant concerns.
Id. at 1139 n.25.
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competitors. The Court has no authority to move in a direction neither
the Congress nor the Supreme Court has accepted.84

In contrast to Warner Communications and Coca-Cola, the importance
of the possibility of collusion was taken seriously by the court in Federal
Trade Commission v. Bass Bros. Enterprises, Inc.85 In an opinion quite responsive to the FTC's brief (discussed below), the court both cited traditional case law to find a "primafacie" violation based on concentration
statistics, and conducted a further examination of the industry involved
which concluded that market power probably could be exercised. This
examination discussed the factors mentioned in the Guidelines and the

FTC Statement, including (from the FTC Statement) the "tendency to86
ward concentration.
Reliance on traditional case law is not confined to judges with long
tenures and who were appointed by Democrats. In two decisions involving FTC challenges to mergers, Judges Bork and Posner, who are
not noted for liberal tendencies, condemned the mergers in opinions

relying principally upon high market shares.87
Judge Bork's opinion, in PPGIndustries, limited its analysis to market
definition and market shares."' As had the district court, the D.C. Circuit
based its finding of market definition principally on defendants' documents or the testimony of industry witnesses.8 9 Although PPG discusses
14Id.

at 1141.

85 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)

66,041 (N.D. Ohio 1984).

6Id. at 68,620-21. Entry was found to be difficult based on sunk capital costs ($50
million), a three-to-five year lead time, customer loyalty, and regulatory uncertainty. Id.
at 68,613-14.
87 Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
1975 (1987); Federal Trade Comm'n v. PPG Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 1900 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Both opinions may have been written with particular care, because both judges had been
on numerous lists of possible Supreme Court nominees.
Post-merger HHI's ranged from 3184 to 5213. Judge Bork observed that the merger
might reduce the number of "strong competitors in the high technology market" from 3
to 2. 798 F.2d at 1505. Although he did not note this, such a reduction would condemn

the merger under the presumptive rule espoused in his book, R.

BORK, THE ANTITRUST

221-22 (1978) (Section 7 should be interpreted "as making presumptively lawful
all horizontal mergers up to market shares that would allow for other mergers of similar
size in the industry and still leave three significant companies"). For an earlier example
of Judge Bork's apparent willingness to give great weight to market shares, see Rothery
Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 230 n.1 1 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork,
J.) ("Antitrust adjudication has always proceeded through inferences about market power
drawn from market shares."), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 880 (1987) (citation omitted).
The court of appeals in PPG Industries affirmed the trial court's finding of probable
illegality, but reversed that part of the district court's opinion that allowed a hold separate
order rather than a preliminary injunction.
89 The trial court cited a PPG document that advocated acquiring Swedlow (the other
party to the merger) in order to "position ... PPG as the dominant force in the free world
PARADOX,
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the Guidelines' HHI thresholds at length, it does not cite the Guidelines'
approach to market definition.
Judge Posner's opinion in Hospital Corporation of America v. Federal
Trade Commission,9 ° is one of the most charming merger opinions
ever. He complimented the Commission on writing an opinion that was
"a model of lucidity," although he wryly observed that "tflhe Commission may have made its task harder (and opinion longer) than
strictly necessary ... by studiously avoiding reliance on any of the Supreme Court's Section 7 decisions from the 1960s except United States v.
PhiladelphiaNational Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), which took an explicitly
economic approach to the interpretation of the statute."'" Judge Posner
explained that even if the precedent from the 1960s had been weakened
by the changing emphasis in antitrust law,92 the modern, economic approach to merger law might have permitted the Commission to rely
simply on evidence of high market shares and barriers to entry 93 (here,
market for high technology transparencies which could prevail for several decades." PPG
Industries, 628 F. Supp. at 884 n.5. PPG's 1984 long-range plan "refers to Swedlow as one
of'our two largest competitors.' "Id. In a letter to employees, "David Swedlow states, '[olur
major competitor is [PPG].' " Id. And "in its 1982 long-range plan, PPG notes that 'the air
frame manufacturer has a choice of glass, plastic, or composite windows, offering him a
variety of material options.' " Id.
90807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1975 (1987).
91807 F.2d at 1385. (In fact, the Commission's opinion, which was written by Commissioner Calvani, cites three other merger cases from the 1960s, but only on the advisability
of considering post-acquisition evidence. 106 F.T.C. at 473 n. 10.) It is interesting to note
thatJudge Posner clerked forJustice Brennan, author of PhiladelphiaNationalBank, during
the term in which it was written. Association of American Law Schools, Directory of Law
Teachers 1978-79, at 592.
'Judge Posner noted that the Supreme Court had never repudiated its 1960s merger
cases, 807 F.2d at 1385, but they may have been undermined by the elevation of "the
economic concept of competition" as "the lodestar that shall guide the contemporary
application of the antitrust laws." Id. at 1386. Given this, "it was prudent for the Commission,
rather than resting on the very strict merger decisions of the 1960s, to inquire into the
probability of harm to consumers." Id.
9' See 807 F.2d at 1388:
In showing that the challenged acquisitions gave four firms control over an
entire market so that they would have little reason to fear a competitive reaction
if they raised prices above the competitive level, the Commission went far tojustify
its prediction of probable anticompetitive effects. Maybe it need have gone no
further. [citing PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank and Monfort (10th Circuit)]
The Seventh Circuit nonetheless reviewed the other factors considered by the Commission
("the low elasticity of demand, the exceptionally severe cost pressures under which American hospitals labor today, the history of collusion in the industry," id. at 1389), and found
that they supported the Commission's conclusion.
For antitrust counselors, it is significant that judge Posner considered HCA's "most
telling point" to be "that the impetus for the Commission's complaint came from a competitor." 807 F.2d at 1391-92. He reasoned that a competitor normally would complain
only about mergers that would lead to lower prices, thus suggesting that the mergers were
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the certificate of need program94 ). Judge Posner did not cite the Guidelines at all.
II. ANTITRUST AGENCY BRIEFING STRATEGIES
Why is the FTC's record in adjudicated merger decisions better than
the Antitrust Division's? The FTC may have been fortunate in the assignment of judges. It may have been blessed with attractive cases.95 Its
"won-lost" record on appeals from Commission adjudicative decisions
undoubtedly has benefited from the skepticism with which the Commission has greeted the arguments of complaint counsel.96 In addition,
however, the Commission's record probably has benefited from its staff's
comparatively pragmatic approach to litigating merger cases, an approach that is complemented by the imprecision of the FTC Statement
and by the Statement's greater harmony with traditional case law.97 Even
if the FTC's approach has not resulted in unexpected successes, it may
have prevented some unexpected defeats. In contrast, the Division has
adhered more closely to the Guidelines, particularly with respect to market definition, and has exhibited a greater interest in shaping the law,
and this may have hurt its record.
Because the FTC's approach is more traditional, it will be discussed
first.
A. FTC

BRIEFING PATTERNS9"

The FTC staff has generally followed case law when litigating market
definition. Perhaps the strongest indication of this is the staff's almost
lawful. Somewhat reluctantly, Judge Posner decided that this apparent opinion of a competing firm "was not binding on the Commission." Id. at 1392.
14 Both of the states involved, and many others, require "certificates of need" before
health care providers may build or increase beds in acute care hospitals. See generally P.
JOSKOW, CONTROLLING HOSPITAL COSTS: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION chs. 5,
7 (1981). The Commission found that certificate of need laws "pose a very substantial
obstacle to both new entry and expansion of bed capacity in the Chattanooga market." See
Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. at 495.
" Cf. White, supra note 9, at 19 (noting egregiousness of Warner Communications and
Coca-Cola. However, records of the hearings in Warner Communicationsand Coca-Cola (and
PPG) suggest that the issues were seriously disputed.
I At the Commission level, complaint counsel have prevailed in less than 25% of recent
merger decisions. See supra note 73. This may have prevented some appellate losses. Compare
Yamaha Motor Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981) (enforcing
with minor modification August 1980 Commission order finding a joint venture illegal)
with Tenneco, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 689 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1982) (vacating
September 21, 1981 potential competition order) and Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp.
v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 652 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1981) (vacating May 1979 order where
Commission erred in market definition and in its interpretation of United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974)).
17 See text accompanying notes 29-38, supra.
"' The discussion that follows makes reference to the following FTC briefs and submis-
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routine invocation of the "submarket" concept,9 9 in spite of the general
rejection of the concept in the Guidelines and the FTC Statement.' 0
More generally, and with a few notable exceptions, on market definition
issues the FTC staff has paid ceremonial obeisance to the Guidelines' 5
sions: Brief of Complaint Counsel, In re PPG Indus., Inc., Dkt. 9204 (administrative
complaint filedJan. 29, 1986), noted, [1983-1987 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
22,325 (brief filed Aug. 8, 1986) [hereinafter FTC PPG Brief]; Plaintiff's Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Federal Trade Comm'n v. PPG Indus., Inc.,
628 F. Supp. 881 (D.D.C.) (No. 86-0022) (filed Feb. 14, 1986), rev'd, 798 F.2d 1500 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) [hereinafter FTC PPG Proposed Findings]; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission's Complaint for a Preliminary
Injunction, Federal Trade Comm'n v. Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1986)
(filed July 2, 1986), vacated without opinion, 829 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter FTC
Coca-ColaBrief]; Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission's Post-Hearing Set of Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Federal Trade Comm'n v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,071 (D.D.C. 1986) (No. 86-0900) (filed Apr. 28,
1986) [hereinafter FTC Occidental Proposed Findings]; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Federal Trade Commission's Motions for Temporary Restraining
Order and for Preliminary Injunction, Federal Trade Comm'n v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,071 (D.D.C. 1986) (No. 86-0900) (filed Apr. 3, 1986)
[hereinafter FTC Occidental Brief]; Brief for Respondent Federal Trade Comm'n, Hospital
Corp. of Am. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986), (No. 85-3185)
(filed Apr. 18, 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1975 (1987) [hereinafter FTC HCA Brief]; Brief
for Appellant, Federal Trade Comm'n v. Warner Communications, Inc., 742 F.2d 1156
(9th Cir. 1984) (No.. 84-5809) (filed Apr. 26, 1984) [hereinafter FTC WarnerAppeal Brief];
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Federal Trade Commission's
Motions for Temporary Restraining Order and for Preliminary Injunction, Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Warner Communications, Inc., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,025 (C.D. Cal.
1984), rev'd, 742 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter FTC Warner Trial Brief; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the FTC's Motions for Temporary Restraining Order and for Preliminary Injunction, Federal Trade Comm'n v. Bass Bros.
Enters., Inc., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 66,041 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (filed Apr. 19, 1984)
[hereinafter FTC Bass Bros. Brief].
. See FTC Coca-Cola Brief at 16 ("There are also local markets in which concentrate
companies could exercise market power."); FTC Occidental Proposed Findings at 32-33
("Within broadly defined relevant geographic markets, there may also be other geographic
markets with Section 7 significance. [citing Brown Shoe and Pabst]"); FTC PPG Proposed
Findings at 12 ("It is well settled that, within a broad overall market, there may be well
defined narrower markets that, in themselves, constitute appropriate markets for antitrust
purposes. [citing Brown Shoe]."); see also id. at 46-47 ("In addition, it is possible to have
several narrower product markets within the outer scope of a more encompassing overall
market.... Just as the relevant product market may be considered both as an overall one
and various narrow ones, so, too, can the geographic market.") (citations of, among other
cases, ContinentalCan, United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 275 (1964),
and Brown Shoe, omitted); FTC Warner Appeal Brief at 31 n.25 ("Whether or not there is a
broader product market inclusive of both prerecorded music and home taped music is
irrelevant to the question of whether prerecorded music alone is also a distinct line of
commerce.") (citations omitted); FTC WarnerTrial Briefat 11 ("The impact of the challenged
merger must then be measured in each economically significant market.... When, as here,
a merger may have anticompetitive ramifications in any market, it must be found to violate
the law."); FTC Bass Bros. Briefat 15 ("The impact of the challenged acquisition must then
be measured in each economically significant market.... If the acquisition may substantially
lessen competition in any market, it violates the law.").
"oSee supra notes 21-22, 35. In other respects, however, case law and the FTC Statement
use comparable tests for market definition. Id.
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percent "foiling" test, and then ignored it as of little practical relevance.' 0'
FTC briefs generally employ a standard format: open with the traditional
market definition standards, acknowledge the approach of the Guidelines, and then retire to the traditional approach, while referring occasionally to responses to price increases.
The proposed findings of fact in PPG provide a good example. The
discussion of product market definition opened by saying a product
market "may be defined in terms of the 'cross-elasticity of demand' or
the 'reasonable interchangeability of use' between the product in question
and potential substitutes," citing Continental Can and duPont (Cellophane).'02 This was followed by a paragraph describing the significance
of customers' ability to respond easily to price increases by turning to
alternatives, but the submission explains that "direct evidence of the
likely effect of a price increase ... will not usually be available," so "it
will usually be necessary to infer the likely parameters of a relevant
product market by evaluating other evidence relating to product substitutability."'0 3 Although the proposed findings referred to a witness's
testimony about likely responses to a price increase, the great bulk of
the argument focused on physical attributes of the products and on the
perceptions of the sellers. Finally, the proposed conclusions of law failed
to mention the Guidelines at all.° 4 Not surprisingly, the PPG defendants
expended considerable energy arguing that "the Commission here ig101
But see FTC Occidental Brief at 9-21 (principally relying on statements of witnesses
concerning responses to price changes). Whether or not because of the FTC's approach
to the issue, the FTC's proposed product markets were not accepted by the court. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 62,512-13.
102 FTC PPG ProposedFindings at 5; see also FTC Coca-ColaBrief at 9 (same opening); FTC
Occidental Brief at 9 (same opening); FTC Bass Bros. Brief at 16 (same opening); FTC Warner
Trial Brief at 11 (same opening). For a comparison between the Guidelines' approach to
market definition and "reasonable interchangeability-cross-elasticity of demand" approach,
see Werden, supra note 20, at 572-75.
11 FTC PPG Proposed Findings at 5-6. Of course, as noted above, see supra at note 19 the
1984 Guidelines, unlike the 1982 Guidelines, also recognize this.
104FTC PPG ProposedFindings at 46-47. Compare FTC Warner Trial Brief at 12-13 (given
huge difference in price between prerecorded music and home taped recordings, a 5%
price increase would be inconsequential) with FTC Warner Appeal Brief at 30-36 ("criteria
include: industry or public recognition of the market as a separate economic entity; peculiar
characteristics; distinct customers; distinct vendors; distinct prices; and sensitivity to price
changes;" Guidelines relegated to two footnotes). Some other FTC briefs devote greater
proportions of their arguments to the consequences of a hypothetical price increase. See
FTC Coca-ColaBriefat 11 (heading reads: "A Significant Increase in the Price of Concentrate
or CSD Would Not Result in Significant Substitution to Other Beverages;" argument uses
this as well as more traditional factors); FTC Bass Bros. Brief at 16-20 (principal focus on
lack of interchangeability, but secondary attention to (related) question of response to
price increases).
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nores this [the Guidelines'] general framework for defining a product
market and in fact fails even to cite the Guidelines in this respect."' °5
The FTC's PPG discussion of geographic markets also did not refer
to the Guidelines; instead, the submission relied on Brown Shoe" 6 and
Pabst Brewing.0 7 Other briefs are similar. 08 Another example of FTC
litigation strategy is provided by its proposed findings in Federal Trade
Commission v. Occidental Petroleum, which argued geographic market under both a Guidelines' "foiling" approach and the Elzinga-Hogarty "pattern of shipments" approach. 0 9
The FTC's approach to litigating competitive effect appears to have
been influenced by its experience in Federal Trade Commission v. Warner
Communications. Much of the trial court brief was devoted to explaining
why "[c]haracteristics of the market" facilitated the "interdependent,
anticompetitive conduct or tacit collusion" that was likely to result from
the challenged joint venture'°-an approach that is consistent with the
FTC Statement."' As noted above, the trial court denied the FTC's
request for a preliminary injunction because it found that collusion was
unlikely. On appeal, the Commission vehemently protested that this was
an improper standard. "Section 7 of the Clayton Act was specifically
intended by Congress to arrest restrictions of competition in their incipiency," the FTC argued, citing du Pont (Cellophane) and Brown Shoe;
"I Pre-Hearing Memorandum of Defendant PPG Industries, Inc. in Opposition to Preliminary Injunction Motion at 42, Federal Trade Comm'n v. PPG Indus., Inc., 628 F.
Supp. 881 (D.D.C. 1986) (No. 86-0022) (filed Jan. 27, 1986), rev'd, 798 F.2d 1500 (D.C.
Cir. 1986).
11 FTC PPG Proposed Findings at 13 ("The relevant geographic market ... must 'correspond to the commercial realities of the industry and be economically significant.'"
[quoting Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 336-37]).
7Id. at 47 ("The market need not be delineated 'by metes and bounds as a surveyor
would lay off a plot of ground.' United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 549
(1966).").
"I See FTC Bass Bros. Brief at 20-23 (citing Pabst but not Guidelines; argument based on
shipping patterns and uniform price movements); FTC Warner Trial Brief at 14-15 (abbreviated argument fails to mention Guidelines).
" FTC OccidentalBrief at 21-24; FTC Occidental ProposedFindings at 32-49; see also FTC
Coca-Cola Brief at 15-16 (citing Brown Shoe and Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,
365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961), and not Guidelines, but discussing foiling concept). See generally
Elzinga & Hogarty, supra note 18. The Occidentalcourt, relying on the Guidelines, rejected
the FTC's attempt to limit the market to the United States. 1986-1 Trade Cas. at 62,513.
"I FTC Warner Trial Brief at 17, 22-26 (noting common pricing practices, easy access to
competitive information, and an absence of large buyers). The discussion of market share
statistics focused almost exclusively on Guidelines' numbers. Id. at 17-22. It included only
a single paragraph comparing numbers found troubling in three earlier cases.
' See supra notes 36-38.
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a "primafacie violation" had been "firmly established" by evidence that
the two defendants were substantial competitors, concentration would
be increased in an industry witnessing a trend toward increased concentration and no recent entry, and some interdependence already was
evident among the major firms." 2 The Ninth Circuit reversed.
The pattern for more recent FTC briefing of "competitive effect" was
set by its brief in Federal Trade Commission v. Bass Bros. Enters., Inc., 113
which the FTC filed nine days after the Warner Bros. trial court defeat.
In the brief, the FTC both relied on traditional case law and told a
collusion story. The brief first presented a four-page, traditional section
captioned "This Acquisition Would Eliminate Substantial Competition
' 4
and Unduly Increase Concentration in the U.S. Carbon Black Market.""
Cases cited include Brown Shoe, ContinentalCan, PhiladelphiaNationalBank,
and Aluminum Co. (Rome Cable). Reference was made to "incipiency," to
preventing even small increases in concentration in concentrated markets, and to the advantages of having many sellers;" 5 alleged market
112FTC Warner Appeal Brief at 37. The FTC's occasional reliance on "trends towards
increased concentration" also is suggestive of its continued use of pre-Guidelines thinking
about competitive effect, although, as noted above, the FTC Statement refers to concentration
trends. In addition to the Warner Appeal Brief, see FTC Bass Bros. Brief at 41-45; id. at
44:
The carbon black industry is not merely witnessing a trend toward higher concentration; the trend is a stampede. . . . A tendency toward concentration has
long been held to be a significant factor in judging the legality of an acquisition,
recognized not only in the case law but also in the more recent guidelines of the
antitrust enforcement agencies. United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S.
441, 461 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 659
(1964); ... Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., supra, 530 F. Supp. at 324-25; FTC
Statement, supra, at [6901-3].).
"3 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,041 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
" FTC Bass Bros. Brief at 25-29.
"5 The discussion features a lengthy quotation from an earlier decision by the District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F. Supp.
315, 319 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 669 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982),
which quotation has been featured in a number of FTC briefs:
[T]he greater the degree of concentration in a particular industry, "the greater
is the likelihood that parallel policies of mutual advantage, not competition, will
emerge." "It is the basic premise of [Section 7] that competition will be most vital
when there are many sellers, none of which has any significant market share."
... What Congress intended in enacting Section 7 was to arrest restraints of trade
and/or monopolistic tendencies "in their incipiency and well before they have
attained such effects as would justify a Sherman Act proceeding."
FTC Bass Bros. Brief at 25-26 (numerous citations omitted); see also FTC PPG Brief at 25,
49, FTC Coca-Cola Brief at 17, 21, and Occidental Brief at 26, 29-30 (all three briefs quoting
first two Marathon Oil sentences, and also featuring another quotation popular with the
FTC, Kauper, The 1982 HorizontalMerger Guidelines: Of Collusion, Efficiency, and Failure,71
CALIF. L. REV. 497, 513 (1983) ("Since explicit collusion is more likely to occur and far
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shares were compared to the Guidelines and to an assortment of cases.
This section was followed by an even longer section arguing that "[t]he
increased concentration resulting from this acquisition creates oppor6
tunities for interdependent, anticompetitive conduct or tacit collusion", 1
and that barriers to entry are substantial." 7 In short, FTC briefs now
include substantial doses of both traditional concern with concentration
and of the more "au courant" concern with collusion.
B.

ANTITRUST DIVISION BRIEFING PATTERNS".

8

Although the Division's approach to merger litigation has not been
altogether consistent, in general the Division has adhered more closely
easier to conceal where concentration is high, the Guidelines' presumptive approach to
highly concentrated markets is justified on the basis of explicit collusion alone.")).
16 FTC Bass Bros. Brief at 29-35.
"7 Id. at 35-40. The "competitive effect" argument in the FTC's briefs in Coca-Cola in
OccidentalPetroleumclosely follow the Bass Bros. pattern, although the discussion of collusion
is only a small part of the Coca-Cola brief and in Occidental Petroleum it is largely limited
to discussion of ease of entry. In FTC PPG Proposed Findings, the conclusions of law
emphasize concentration, the loss of inter-firm competition, and entry barriers, rather
than collusion as such, id. at 47-51, but the proposed findings of fact include a discussion
of the market's susceptibility to collusion, id.at 20-21.
The FTC's brief in Hospital Corp. of Am. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, is an exception
to the usual pattern. Much of the traditional rhetoric is absent, although the brief, unlike
Commissioner Calvani's opinion, makes passing references to the principal holdings of
Brown Shoe, Continental Can, and Federal Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386
U.S. 568, 577 (1967), FTC HCA Brief at 39-41, 55 n.79. The brief explicitly states that
"market share data alone are not conclusive," Brief at 40, and gives significant attention
to the various qualitative factors on which the Commission relied, id. at 42-37 (entry
barriers, low price elasticity of demand, ease of engaging of price discrimination, tradition
of information exchanges and of coordinated behavior). See generally Hospital Corp. of
Am., 106 F.T.C. at 489-511.
..The discussion below makes reference to the following Antitrust Division briefs: Brief
for Appellant United States, United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., Dkt. 87-2343SI (8th Cir. notice of appeal filed Oct. 1,1987) (brief filed Dec. 16, 1987) [hereinafter DO]
ADM Appeal Brie]]; Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, United States v. ArcherDaniels-Midland Co., Civ. No. 83-51-D (S.D. Iowa filed Aug. 6, 1987) (brief filed Jan. 9,
1987) [hereinafter DOJ ADM Motion Brief]; Reply Brief for Appellant United States, United
States v. Central State Bank, 817 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1987) (No. 85-1832) (brief filed June
6, 1986) [hereinafter DOJ Central State Reply Brief]; Brief for Appellant United States,
Central State Bank (brief filed Apr. 17, 1986) [hereinafter DOJ Central State Appeal Brief];
Government's Pretrial Brief, United States v. Central State Bank, 621 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D.
Mich. 1985) (No. G82-72 CA) (brief filed Nov. 1, 1984) [hereinafter DOJ Central State Trial
Brief]; Plaintiff's Trial Brief, United States v. Rice Growers Ass'n, 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
67,288 (E.D.Cal. 1986) (No. 84-1066 EJG) (brief filed Jan. 10, 1985), motion for reconsideration denied, 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,287 (E.D. Cal. 1986) [hereinafter DOJ Rice
Growers Briejf; Memorandum of Law in Support of the Government's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, United States v. Calmar Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1298 (D.N.J. 1985) (No.
84-5271) (DRD) (brief filed Jan. 4, 1985) [hereinafter DOJ Calmar Brief]; Brief for the
Appellee United States, United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir.
1984) (No. 83-6365) (brief filed Apr. 23, 1984) [hereinafter DOJ Waste Management Appeal
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to the Guidelines-particularly in their approach to market definitionthan the FTC. For instance, at least two briefs proclaim that their "legal
analysis ... is drawn primarily from the case law and the United States
Department of Justice 1984 Merger Guidelines."" 9 Division briefs also
have tended to be less adversarial, more balanced or even academic, and
more directed toward changing the law.
1. Faithfulness to the Guidelines
The Division's comparative faithfulness to the Guidelines, and the
resulting contrast with the FTC, is seen most sharply on issues of market
definition. Whereas FTC briefs typically feature cases and merely acknowledge the Guidelines, Division briefs typically feature the Guidelines. "' Although several Division briefs cite or quote Brown Shoe's
"reasonable interchangeability" and "cross-elasticity of demand" standards, the briefs typically devote substantially more attention to whether
or not consumers would change consumption patterns in response to a
"small but significant and non-transitory increase in price. '",2
Brief]; Plaintiff's Post-Trial Brief, United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 588 F. Supp.
498 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (No. 81 Civ. 1113) (brief filed Sept. 15, 1981) [hereinafter DOJ Waste
Management Trial Brief]; United States v. Virginia Nat'l Bankshares, Inc., 1982-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 1 64,871 (W.D. Va. 1982) (Civ. No. 82-0083B) (brief filed June 9, 1982)
[hereinafter DOJ Virginia National Brief].
119 See DOJ ADM Motion Brief at 10:
Although they do not purport to be an exact statement of the law, the Merger
Guidelines incorporate the fundamental principles of Section 7 case law into a
comprehensive methodology for defining markets and evaluating the competitive
impact of mergers and acquisitions. They set forth the standards applied by the
Department of Justice in deciding whether to bring a case and have been relied
upon by courts in applying Section 7.
(citations omitted); see also DOJ CalmarBrief at 2 (same).
110See DOJ ADM Appeal Brief(discussed below); DOJ ADM Motion Briefat 10-11 ("General
Principles" discussion based on Guidelines preceded "Product Market Definition" section
based on case law and Guidelines); DOJ CalmarBrief at 9-10 (no cases cited in first three
paragraphs, covering more than a page); cf. DOJ Rice Growers Brief (thorough shuffling of
case law and Guidelines). There are exceptions to this pattern. The Division's trial brief
in Waste Management, which was filed September 1981, enthusiastically opened its discussion
of product market definition by proclaiming that "[t]he leading case ... remains Brown
Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)." Brief at 45. The Waste Management
appellate brief also gives substantial attention to the Brown Shoe tests, see Brief at 11, 1415, 26-27, and, although it refers to the foiling test, Brief at 15 & n.18, 40, never cites
the Guidelines. The Central State trial brief cites both case law and the Guidelines for
geographic market definition, Brief at 32, 39-41, and principally relies on case law for
product market definition. The CentralState appeal brief posits a foiling test but does not
cite the Guidelines. Brief at 41.
121 See DOJ ADM Appeal Brief (discussed below); DOJ ADM Motion Brief at 11, 13, 15, 2325; DOJ Rice Growers Brief at 21-25, 27-29, 31-33; DOJ CalmarBrief at 9-10, 13-14, 1620; DOJ Virginia Nat'l Bank at 13-14, 16, 18, 27. But see DOJ CentralState Bank Trial Brief
(brief relied on traditional tests); cf Waste Management Trial Brief(same). The Division first
featured the foiling test in Virginia National Bank, although the Guidelines had not been
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The Division's dedication to the Guidelines' approach to market definition is strikingly illustrated by its recently filed appellate brief in ArcherDaniels-Midland.This case featured cross-motions for summary judgment
on product market definition, with the Division arguing for a market
limited to high fructose corn syrup ("HFCS") and defendants arguing
that sucrose and other sweeteners should be included. The Division lost,
and the trial court issued a lengthy and quite traditional opinion holding
that "undisputed evidence of interchangeability, cross-elasticity and price
22
correlation between HFCS and sugar" supported the broader market.1
The Division's appellate brief made an unenthusiastic argument that the
court misapplied these tests, 12 but boldly centered its appeal on the trial
court's failure to apply the Guidelines' approach to market definition.
Thus, the first, and predominant, issue on appeal is said to be "[w]hether
the district court erred in holding legally irrelevant abundant evidence
that a small but significant and non-transitory increase in the price of
HFCS would not cause HFCS users to switch to sugar ....,1124 To overcourt was said to have erred because
state the matter only slightly, the trial
125
it failed to apply the Guidelines.
issued by the time the trial brief was filed and the Division was still citing and quoting the
case law of the 1960s, Brief at 10-11, 14. The heart of the Division's case was a survey
that was to "demonstrate that customers would respond to a significant extent to price
changes by shifting their business to banks in other nearby communities." Id. at 27. The
importance of approaching the issue consistently with the Guidelines is suggested by a
prominent statement of the test of a geographic market-a statement that is consistent
with the Guidelines but quite unhelpful in a case in which the Government is seeking to
expand the market proposed by defendants: "The key question is what is the smallest area
in which a group of sellers would likely be able explicitly or tacitly to coordinate their
actions and raise prices or otherwise depart from competitive market performance." Id.
at 14 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
122 United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., Civ. No. 83-51-D, slip op. at 25 (S.D.
Iowa Aug. 6, 1987).
12 DOJ ADM Appeal Brief at 37-43.
124DOJ ADM Appeal Brief at 2; see also id. at 16 ("the court applied an improper test of
market definition in holding that undisputed evidence of interchangeability, cross-elasticity,
and significant price correlation precluded the government from proving that the relevant
product market consists of HFCS alone"). The Division modestly noted that "[t]he district
court ... was not obligated to use the Merger Guidelines," as such, id. at 27, but it clearly
is asking the Eighth Circuit to hold that the trial court erred in not using them.
Archer-Daniels-Midlandprovides another example of the Division's faithfulness to the
125
Guidelines. Although the Division argued that HFCS suppliers chose an "underpricing
strategy ... for displacing sugar," and this was a cause of the correlation between the
prices of HFCS and sucrose, DOJ ADM Motion Brief at 36, the Division's market definition
theory addresses only the possibility that an HFCS monopolist could increase prices from
today's level. See DOJ ADM Appeal Brief at 22 n.24. This is in accord with the Guidelines,
which are concerned only with prospective increases in a group of competitors' ability to
raise prices. Both the 1982 and 1984 Guidelines define markets by postulating hypothetical
price increases (usually 5%, although in practice the Division is now using 10%), and then
measuring buyer responses (usually within one year). 1982 GUIDELINES, 2 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) at 6881-8; 1984 GUIDELINES, 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) at 6879-9.
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The best illustration of the difference between the Division's and the
FTC's approach to litigating mergers is their treatment of the "submarket" concept. Division briefs are markedly more faithful to the Guidelines' abandonment of this concept. In Calmar, Rice Growers, and Central
State Bank the Division was arguing for narrow markets, but did not
resort to the submarket concept. The Division's Virginia National Bank
brief mentioned submarkets. 6 but did not rely on them.127 The ArcherDaniels-Midlandappellate brief also is a good example of the Division's
distaste for submarkets. In the district court, the Division had argued
that HFCS and sucrose, and only these two products, "are functionally
interchangeable for virtually every known use of HFCS."'' 8 In classic
submarket reasoning, Division trial lawyers further argued that "It]he
existence of a market including both HFCS and sucrose would not negate
the existence of a market including only HFCS, since narrow relevant
product markets may be carved out of broader product markets."', 29 The
Division's appellate brief firmly disassociated itself from this use of the
submarket concept.' 0 The brief argued that the relevant market-the
only relevant market-is HFCS."'
126 DOJ Virginia National Brief at 11 ("Within a broad product market, there may also
exist relevant product sub-markets which will be adversely affected by a merger or acquisition.") (quoting at length from Brown Shoe). The brief also claimed that each of a
number of banking services could constitute a separate submarket, Brief at 13, but this
possibility did not affect the outcome of the litigation. See infra note 141.
"7 Since the Division was advocating a broader geographic market than defendants
(although only a single county), the submarket concept would not have been directly
applicable, but it might have been useful as part of an explanation of why merger of banks
in separate towns could lessen competition even if each town, separately, was a focus of
competition.
122 DOJ ADM Motion Brief at 15.
29
1 DOJ ADM Motion Briefat 34 (citing Continental Can, Rome Cable, and Brown Shoe). The
Division's rechristening of the concept of submarkets as "narrow relevant product markets"
is indicative of its reluctance to rely on the concept, as is its relegation of any mention of
the concept to the last half of the brief. Cf.id. n.20 ("Narrow relevant product markets
contained within broader markets are sometimes described as 'submarkets' in antitrust
cases"). See generally Complaint at 6, United States v. Industrial Asphalt, Civ. No. 85 4631
(RC) (C.D. Cal. filed July 15, 1985) (merger complaint alleging submarkets rechristened
as "smaller geographic markets within the greater Los Angeles market").
110See DOJ ADM Appeal Brief at 13 ("The court, thinking that the government proposed
HFCS as a relevant product 'submarket,' ....").The appellate brief was written by an
entirely new group of attorneys (including the assistant attorney general and one of his
deputies). The district court brief had been signed by five staff attorneys; the senior one
is listed as "of counsel" on the appellate brief.
131Involvement of high-ranking attorneys also was associated with decreased attention
to submarkets in Waste Management. On appeal; the Government was trying to preserve
trash collection markets that separated Fort Worth from Dallas and commercial from
residential service. The post-trial brief, which had been written in Fall 1981, by six trial
attorneys, relied heavily on the submarket concept. DOJ Waste Management Trial Brief at 7
("Nor is the existence of a broad market inconsistent with a relevant geographic sub-
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Although Division briefs are quite faithful to the Guidelines in their
approach to market definition, they generally follow traditional case law
when arguing likely competitive effect. Division briefs rely heavily on
the presumption flowing from high market shares and concentration,
2
However, recent
and tell less of a "collusion story" than does the FTC."
33
trends.'
Division briefs do not discuss concentration
2. Shaping the Law
Antitrust Division briefs also differ from FTC briefs in that more of
them appear concerned with issues somewhat extraneous to the litigation
immediately in question. To oversimplify, the FTC seems more interested
in winning, the Division seems more interested in shaping the law.
The bank cases are the best examples of the Division's concern with
shaping the law.13 4 For quite some time now-indeed, since before Philmarket.") (citations omitted); id. at 45 (Brown Shoe also held that identifiable submarkets,
within a broader product market, must also be examined ... ") (emphasis in original); id.
at 47. On appeal, in a brief written by the assistant attorney general, one of his deputies,
and three other Division lawyers (only one of whom had worked on the trial brief), no
mention was made of submarkets. D)J Waste Management Appeal Brief. However, the disappearance of the submarket concept from the appellate brief also could be explained by
the trial court's failure to rely on the concept. Cf. 588 F. Supp. at 507 ("submarkets"
mentioned only when rejecting Government's proposed equipment-determined submarkets).
"I2See DOJ Waste ManagementAppeal Brief at 47-48 ("if a defendant fails to demonstrate
such [General Dynamics] 'mitigating factors' a finding of illegality on the basis of market
share and concentration is proper" [citing Brown Shoe]); DOJ Rice Growers Brief at 9-11,
16-20 & n. 12 (market share and concentration result in presumption that "can be rebutted
... only by a clear showing that other market characteristics would preclude the merger
from substantially lessening competition"; market shares compared to Supreme Court and
Ninth Circuit cases and to Guidelines); DOJ Central State Trial Brief at 57-59 & n.169
(noting market shares in other bank merger cases; also arguing entry barriers); DOJ Calmar
Brief at 21-24 & n.4 (comparing market shares to Supreme Court and Third Circuit cases
and to Guidelines; also arguing entry barriers); DOJ Virginia NationalBrief at 28-31 (citing
Supreme Court's "strong presumptive test" and Guidelines).
13 Cf DOJ Waste Management Trial Briefat 111 (trends discussed in brief filed September
1981). In the Division's Central State Bank appeal brief, at 45 n.55, the Division explained
that the decline in the merged bank's market share, subsequent to the merger, was consistent
with the Division's assertion that competition had been harmed.
34 Archer-Daniels-Midlandalso may be an example. The judge was unreceptive to the
defendants' motion for summary judgment, since, he reasoned, "although the material
evidentiary facts are not in dispute, there remains a genuine issue as to the ultimatefact of
relevant product market." United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., Civ. No. 83-51D, slip op. at 1, n.l (order of dismissal filed May 29, 1987). However, the Division crossmoved for summary judgment, and "urged" the court "to resolve the relevant product
market issue, one way or the other, on the motions." Id. Only in its appeal brief, after
defendants won summary judgment, did the Division suggest there were factual disputes.
DOJ ADM Appeal Brief at 41-43.
One can only speculate about why the Division did not respond to the defendants' motion
simply by opposing it, and asserting numerous factual disputes. It is at least plausible that
the Division, which appears to be enthusiastic about the use of summary judgment in
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adelphiaNationalBank135-economists and other commentators have concluded that competition in financial services can best be understood by
considering a number of separate, "disaggregated" product markets, e.g.,
consumer transaction accounts, business transaction accounts, consumer
loans, commercial loans (and maybe small business commercial loans). 36
The Antitrust Division has been converted and has preached this gospel
in several forums, including in its comments to the banking regulatory
agencies, which initially decide the lawfulness of most proposed mergers
of banks and thrift institutions. 137 Although the Division's position is
analytically sound, these agencies remain unpersuaded and continue to
use "commercial banking" product markets.'
Having failed to convince the banking agencies, the Division has sought
to advance its view of banking market definition at trial." 9 Thus, in
Virginia National Bankshares, the Division asserted separate "wholesale"
and "retail" banking markets, and numerous service-specific submarkets
within each market, and it freely admitted that it had "defined the lines
antitrust cases, might have been particularly enchanted with the prospect of winning
summary judgment on such a fact-specific issue as market definition. See generally Calkins,
Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and other Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the
Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065 (1986). However, the Division's interest in deciding a
central issue on summary judgment also may have been stimulated by its perception that
defendants were planning an imposing "efficiencies defense," the burden of which could
have "dwarfed" the burden of market definition. See DOJ ADM Trial Brief at 2 n.2.
1'5
Appellees in CentralState Bank pointedly noted that the Government's chief economist
"disagreed with the Supreme Court in 1963 when it first defined the relevant product
market in bank cases to be commercial banking." Appellees' Brief at 38.
136 See DOJ Central State Appeal Brief; Comments of the United States Department of
Justice in re FDIC Statement of Policy on Bank Merger Transactions (Nov. 4, 1985); Letter
from Charles F. Rule, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to Paul A. Volcker, re Comerica
Incorporated-Michigan National Bank (Aug. 7, 1985); Hauberg, Mergers & Acquisitions:
Trends in Competitive Analysis, 6 Banking Expansion Rptr. No. 13, at 1 (July 6, 1987); see
also Note, The Line of Commercefor CommercialBank Mergers: A Product-OrientedRedefinition,
96 HARV. L. REV. 907 (1983) (an influential (and persuasive) statement of this position);
White, The PartialDeregulationof Banks & Other Depository Institutions, in REGULATORY REFORM: WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED ch. 6 (Weiss & Klass eds. 1986).
"' See supra note 136; see also ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS ch. 3.G (2d ed. 1984 &
Supp. 1986); S.Calkins, Bank Mergers and Competition (Sept. 9, 1987) (prepared for the
Banking Law Institute sponsored by the University of Texas School of Law and the Texas
Department of Banking).
3I However, these agencies are increasingly including some or all of the deposits of thrift
institutions in their calculations of market shares, and they have started to consider, in an
unquantified way, the presence of non-depository institutions. Numerous cases are reviewed in the authorities cited in the preceding two footnotes.
M See, e.g., PhiladelphiaNat'lBank, 201 F. Supp. at 361 (Government alleged the follbwing
markets: "Commercial banking, commercial and industrial loans, installment lending to
individuals, single payment loans to individuals, real estate loans, personal trusts, time
deposits of partnerships and corporations, time and savings deposits, demand deposits,
and IPC (Individual, Partnership and Corporation) demand deposits").
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of commerce ... differently than it has in most bank cases."' 4 ° What is
intriguing about the Division's advocacy of these markets-advocacy on
which it expended considerable effort-is that product market definition
did not appear likely to affect the outcome of the litigation. 41
The Division's'campaign to reform bank merger law also appears to
have influenced its strategy in United States v. Central State Bank. 42 The
extent of this influence can be best understood in light of the facts. The
two largest banks in rural Benzie County, Michigan, combined to control
over 60 percent of total deposits. 43 Although the defendants initially
argued that thrifts and nondepository institutions should be included in
the market, 4 4 this argument was unlikely to affect the outcome significantly since Benzie County had no thrifts and had only two insignificant
credit unions 4 ' (and the court ultimately defined the product market as
commercial banking). The defendants' only hope of prevailing was to
expand the geographic market to include at least a second county, Grand
Traverse County-including, as the determinative location, Traverse
City, a regional center 32 miles away from one bank, and 40 miles away
from the other. Between Traverse City and the two banks lies mostly
farm land; the connecting ribbon is a two-lane country road, and the
land is snow-covered much of the year.
The record appeared favorable to the Government. Simple geography
compelled a one-county market: who would travel 45 minutes 46 to do
their banking when alternatives were at hand? The merging banks drew
almost all of their business from within the county, 147 and the Division
had assembled what appeared to be impressive testimony from local
140

DOJ Virginia National Brief at 11.

"I See Virginia Nat'l Bankshares, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 72,350 (after noting that
the parties would not agree to a stipulated product market, the court reviewed a number
of proposed market definitions and then concluded that "it really doesn't make any difference which of these definitions you wanted to go to"); Wertheimer, DOJ Tries Out its 5Percent Geographic Market Test, Legal Times, Aug. 30, 1982, at 17 ("the case was tried solely
on the geographic market issue").
14 817 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1987).

"1'621 F. Supp. at 1280, 1286. The combination was effected only indirectly, through
the acquisition of a bank by an individual controlling another bank.
'44Defendants' Trial Brief at 16 (brief filed Nov. 1, 1984), United States v. Central State
Bank, 621 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (No. G82-72-CA7) ("The Government will
contend that the relevant product market is limited to commercial banks. Defendants
contend that, with the advent of deregulation in the banking industry, all institutions that
offer financial services and products to the public must be included in the market.").
141 DOJ Central State Appeal Brief at 5 n.4.
146Computed and recorded by a government-sponsored videotape introduced as evidence. DOJ Central State Appeal Brief at 16.
147DOJ Central State Trial Brief at 43-44.
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bankers that they looked only to in-county banks when setting loan
rates. 4 ' Even one of the defendants had testified (in another proceeding)
that the relevant market was limited to the county!'49
Somehow the defendants won a bench trial by persuading the trial
court to find that the geographic market nonetheless included Grand
Traverse County. 5 ° The court essentially relied on only three pieces of
evidence. First, the 1980 census showed that 17.2 percent of Benzie
County's residents were employed in Grand Traverse County. Second,
a market study comprised of a survey of 400 people funded by the
Traverse City newspaper (hardly an unbiased sponsor) found that almost
30 percent of Benzie County residents use a Grand Traverse supermarket
as their sole or primary food source, and an additional 27 percent use
it as a secondary food source, and a substantial minority of Benzie County
residents had made their last clothing purchase in Traverse City. Third,
banks located in Grand Traverse County held 15.03 percent of the deposits of Benzie County residents. Based on these three facts, the court
concluded that "Benzie residents may practicably turn to Grand Traverse
banks for banking services."
The Division appealed, but not on geographic market grounds. Instead,
it argued that the trial court had committed a single error of law, namely,
holding "that the Supreme Court has established, as a matter of law,
that the product market within which the effect of an acquisition involving commercial banks must be evaluated is a 'cluster' of all commercial
banking services."'' The Division then devoted 10 of the 20 pages of
148DOJ

Central State Appeal Brief at 17.
"4DOJ Central State Appeal Brief at 17 n.22. Other evidence included the Michigan
Employment Security Commission's definition of the Grand Traverse labor market, which
included two other counties but not Benzie County, id. at 18 n.26, and the failure of banks
outside Benzie County to advertise or be listed in the Benzie County telephone directory,
id. at 17 n.24.
"' 621 F. Supp. at 1280, 1293. The court relied essentially on only three pieces of
evidence. First, the 1980 census showed that 17.2 percent of Benzie County's residents
were employed in Grand Traverse County. Id. at 1280, 1293. Second, a market study
comprised of a survey of 400 people funded by the Traverse City newspaper (hardly an
unbiased sponsor) found that almost 30 percent of Benzie County residents use a Grand
Traverse supermarket as their sole or primary food source, and an additional 27 percent
use it as a secondary food source, and a substantial minority of Benzie County residents
had made their last clothing purchase in Traverse City. Id. at 1281, 1293 (numbers multiplied by author). Third, banks located in Grand Traverse County held 15.03 percent of
the deposit of Benzie County residents. Id. at 1281-82, 1983. On page 1293, the court
misstates the percentage as 18.72 percent, but from page 1282 it is clear that this figure
refers to holdings at all Grand Traverse financial institutions, not just commercial banks.)
Based on these three facts, the court concluded that "Benzie residents may practicably
turn to Grand Traverse banks for banking services." Id. at 1294.
151 DOJ CentralState Appeal Briefat 2. According to the Division, the first "issue presented"
on appeal was "[w]hether the district court correctly held that the product market in
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its argument to explaining why the traditional "commercial banking"
market must be expanded to include thrifts and nondepository institutions.'
Finally, the Division argued that the trial court should have
defined several separate product markets-"small business loans, consumer transaction accounts, and business transaction accounts" 15 3-and
then argued that had it done so, the court would have defined a onecounty market for each of these three product markets.
Although the Division's characterization of the lower court's opinion
was a little unfair,'54 the Division's position was correct as a matter of
legal theory. Geographic markets should be defined in light of product
markets; consumers and businesses purchase a number of different financial services; a merger of financial service providers can best be evaluated by considering its effect on competition to provide each of several
services, each in an appropriate geographic market; and, had the trial
court done this, it might well have found for the Division (and improved
bank merger law in the process).
Even if the Division's position was sound as a matter of theory, however,
it was not the strategy best calculated to achieve reversal of the lower
court's opinion. A commercial banking market is not inconsistent with
finding a one-county geographic market, according to traditional case
law. In both PhiladelphiaNational Bank and Phillipsburg National Bank,
trial courts had reasoned that the ability of major commercial banking
customers to borrow statewide or even nationwide compelled a finding
of a broad geographic market. In both cases the Supreme Court reversed,
using reasoning quite consonant with that currently advanced by the
Division, except that the Court used geographic submarkets to respond
to the special needs of small consumers, whereas the Division would
commercial bank merger cases is predetermined as a matter of law and that it was precluded
from considering the issue as a question of fact." Id. at 1. The other issue was "[w]hether
this case should be remanded for findings of fact by the district court with respect to the
effect of the challenged acquisition on competition in product and geographic markets
defined on the basis of the record." Id.
152DOJ Central State Appeal Brief at 28-32, 33-37.
DOJ Central State Appeal Brief at 38 (relying almost exclusively on its expert witness).
The Government had jumped on the lower court's finding "as a matter of law" that
the product market was the traditional cluster market, and asserted that "the court believed
that it was not at liberty to take account of the effect of the acquisition on individual bank
services." DOJ Brief at 3. In fact, the trial court discussed some of the relevant evidence
and appears merely to have mischaracterized a fact-finding as a finding of law; the court
of appeals recognized this and applied a "clearly erroneous" standard. 817 F.2d at 24
("Because the trial court anchored its decision upon the facts developed during the course
of trial, its relevant product market definition is reviewable by this court under the clearly
erroneous standard.") (citation omitted); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Finding of fact shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous .... ").
'5
'
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respond to those needs more elegantly with disaggregated product markets.
In PhiladelphiaNationalBank, the trial court had dismissed the action
after finding that the geographic market substantially exceeded the fourcounty Philadelphia metropolitan area where the merging firm had offices, because bank customers-and particularly larger ones-could turn
to suppliers outside the area.'55 The Supreme Court reversed, and, based
on its own review of the record, limited the market to the metropolitan
area. The Court grounded its decision squarely on the inability of small
56
customers to obtain certain banking services at significant distances.
See 201 F. Supp. 348, 364 (E.D. Pa. 1962):
Not only must the Court consider the origin of the bank's business, but equally
as important are the alternatives available to the customer. Borrowers are not
limited by political boundaries, although the smaller ones are limited in range.
The alternatives available necessarily depend on the size and financial condition
of the customer.
The larger customers definitely have alternatives ranging from regional to
national. It was very surprising to learn at the trial of this case that not only New
York banks solicit and receive substantial business from customers within the fourcounty area, but also large banks from all the larger cities in the nation do likewise.
Further, the Court is satisfied that PNB and Girard derive a substantial amount
of business from without the four-county area.
What then is the "section of the country"?... [I]t probably would be more
accurate to state that the relevant geographic market ...includes the greater part
of the northeastern United States.
156 In now-famous language, the Court wrote as follows:
'55

The proper question ...is not where the parties to the merger do business or
even where they compete, but where, within the area of competitive overlap, the
effect of the merger on competition will be direct and immediate. See Bok, Mergers
and Markets (1960), 42 .... In banking, as in most service industries, convenience
of location is essential to effective competition. Individuals and corporations typically confer the bulk of their patronage on banks in their local community; they
find it impractical to conduct their banking. business at a distance. [citing, in a
footnote, testimony that 'small business concerns known primarily locally... may
consider that their market is a strictly local one,"' 374 U.S. at 358 n.35]
We recognize that the area within which appellees have their offices does not
delineate with perfect accuracy an appropriate "section of the country".
Large
borrowers and large depositors ...may find it practical to do a large part of their
banking business outside their home community; very small borrowers and depositors'may, as a practical matter, be confined to bank offices in their immediate
neighborhood;... So also, some banking services are evidently more local in nature
than others. But that in banking the relevant geographical market is a function
of each separate customer's economic scale means simply that a workable compromise must be found: some fair intermediate delineation which avoids the
indefensible extremes of drawing the market either so expansively as to make the
effect of the merger upon competition seem insignificant, because only the very
largest bank customers are taken into account in defining the market, or so
narrowly as to place appellees in different markets, because only the smallest
customers are considered.
374 U.S. at 357-58, 360-6 1. In response to the defendants' claim that large banks outside
the Philadelphia area provided competition, the Court reasoned that "competition from
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The Court noted the high percentage of the defendants' business that
originated in the metropolitan area (between 54 percent and 93 percent,
for various kinds of loans),1 57 and discounted even the relatively small
percentage of business that the merging firms earned outside Philadelphia, since most of that business was with large customers, which "reinforces the thesis that the smaller the customer, the smaller is his banking
market geographically."'5 8
Similarly, in Phillipsburg,the district court had upheld a merger based
upon its finding that an area surrounding the two towns in which the
banks had offices, including towns from one to 16 miles away, was an
area of "economic integration" with "[r]egular movement of population
to and from places of business and employment and to stores for consumer goods throughout the entire area.' ' The Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion that (1) defined the product market as commercial
banking, 6 0 but (2) defined the geographic market by emphasizing the
needs of small depositors and small borrowers. The Court explained
that "it is important to consider the places from which it [a bank] draws
its business, the location of its offices, and where it seeks business."''
outside the area would only be important to the larger borrowers and depositors. If so,
the four-county area remains a valid geographical market in which to assess the anticompetitive effect of the proposed merger upon the banking facilities available to the smaller
customer-a perfectly good 'line of commerce,' in light of Congress' evident concern...
with preserving small business." 374 U.S. at 360 n.37 (citation omitted).
The Court's emphasis on a submarket approach is made clear from the referenced
discussion by Dr. Betty Bock: [Any geographic area where an acquisition makes, or may
make, a substantial competitive difference is an appropriate one for scrutiny. The areas
closest to a company's plants may be relevant if competition there is affected. But a showing
that competition is not substantially affected in such an area will not validate an acquisition
if there may be substantial competitive effects elsewhere." B. BocK, MERGERS AND MARKETS:
AN ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW 42 (1960) (emphasis in original).
1 374 U.S. at 359 & n.36. The Court also referenced non-binding geographic market
definitions by the banking agencies. Id. at 361 (citing reports by the FDIC and the FRB
to the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Comptroller's statement approving the merger).
"1'374 U.S. at 321 & n.36.
19 306 F. Supp. 645, 654 (D.N.J. 1969).
160399 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1970) (reversing district court, which appeared to have considered competition from other financial institutions).
I'l
399 U.S. at 363. Also emphasizing the importance of where the merging firms draw
their customers is a potential competition case, United States v. Connecticut National Bank,
418 U.S. 656 (1974). There the trial court, finding for defendant, had defined the state
of Connecticut as the relevant geographic market. This was improper, the Court wrote,
because the two banks "are not direct competitors on that basis." 418 U.S. at 667. Their
offices were in and most of their business was from southwest Connecticut. " 'Common
sense.., would indicate that the relevant market areas of CNB and FNH [the two banks]
generally coincide with where each has established branch offices.' "418 U.S. at 656, quoting
the trial court, 362 F. Supp. 240, 250 (D. Conn. 1973). In a potential competition case,
"the relevant geographic market of the acquired bank is the localized area in which that
bank is in significant, direct competition with other banks, albeit not the acquiring bank."
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(The banks drew over 85 percent of their business from the two towns. 62 )
As for where customers might turn, the Court was impressed by one
witness' testimony that one town's families all "deal with one or another
of the three commercial banks in that city" and "[tihe town's businessmen
prefer to do the same."'' 63 Finally, quoting its earlier opinion in Philadelphia NationalBank, the Court reasoned that in banking, "convenience
of location is essential to effective competition," particularly for the business of small customers.164
Although the market definition discussions of Philadelphia National
Bank and Phillipsburgare not models of elegance, they are clear precedent
for defining commercial banking geographic markets based upon the
needs of small businesses and of consumers desiring transaction accounts.
Accordingly, the disaggregation of banking services was not necessary
to prevail on geographic market definition. 65 Nor was disaggregation
important for measuring market shares. 166 Thus, the Division's approach
67
must be explained by its interest in reforming bank merger law.
418 U.S. at 667; see also United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 622
(1974) (market is "the area in which the acquired firm is an actual, direct' competitor")
(potential competition case).
162Id. at 363.
16 399 U.S. at 356.
16 399 U.S. at 364:
The small borrower ...must often depend upon his community reputation and
upon his relationship with the local banker. PNB [one of the merging banks], for
instance, has made numerous unsecured loans on the basis of character, which
are difficult for local borrowers to get elsewhere. And, as we said in Philadelphia
Bank, supra, at 369, "IsImall businessmen especially are, as a practical matter,
confined to their locality for the satisfaction of their credit needs .. "
The Court also reasoned that small depositors may patronize convenient banks even at
the price of forgoing higher interest rates offered elsewhere. 399 U.S. at 363.
165 Cf.DOJ Virginia NationalBrief at 17-18 (quoting PhiladelphiaNational Bank's language
about small customers, without making clear the relation of this argument to the Division's
product market argument). Compare DOJ Central State Trial Brief at 40-42, 49 (quoting
much of the PhiladelphiaNat'l Bank and .Phillipsburglanguage discussed above) with DOJ
Central State Appeal Brief (language not quoted).
" See DOJ Central State Trial Brief at 60 ("courts have generally relied on shares of total
deposits as a reasonable proxy for the relative strength of banking competitors in consumer
and business banking and for such specific products as transaction accounts and business
loans as well"); DOJ Virginia National Brief at 30 ("Since deposits support loan portfolios
as well as other services, they have traditionally been used as a proxy for various services
which can comprise lines of commerce.").
'67
That the Division was interested in reforming bank merger law also is suggested by
the Division's assembling, prior to the filing of the Central State appeal, a series of letters
from the banking agencies that the Division characterized as supporting its views: "Before
pursuing the present appeal, the Antitrust Division took steps to confirm that its reading
of Philadelphia was shared by the federal banking agencies. All three agencies informed
us by letter that they agreed with this legal position." DOJ Central State Reply Brief at 7-8
(citing letters); see also Hauberg, supra note 136, at 11 nn.17-19 (citing letters). If this
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3. Effect of Division's Approach on Outcomes
It seems reasonably clear under the Antitrust Division's approach to
merger litigation, winning is a subsidiary concern, subsidiary to an interest in adhering to the Guidelines' approach to market definition, and,
on occasion, to an interest in shaping the law in other respects. It would
be surprising if this relative deemphasis on winning did not adversely
affect the Division's record in court, and in fact, this appears to have
been the case. The reliance on established case law in the numerous
recent opinions condemning mergers at least suggests that a plaintiff
who foreswears reliance on this law places itself at a disadvantage. 68
To the extent that the Division's approach handicaps it, much of the
problem is attributable to the difficulty of litigating the Guidelines' approach to market definition." 9 The 1984 Guidelines themselves recognize that evidence directly relevant to their central foiling inquiry usually
will be unavailable, and numerous observers have concurred or have
more strongly emphasized the challenges of applying this test in an
adversarial context. 70 Although the Guidelines' measure of concentration, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, has been widely used, the Guidelines are rarely cited regarding market definition.' 7' The Guidelines'
characterization was meant to suggest that the agencies agreed with the Division's approach
to defining banking markets, it is something of an exaggeration, since the letters do little
more than express a willingness to consider markets other than commercial banking.
"6As is discussed further below, the Division could not completely ignore the Guidelines
in litigation, even though the Guidelines were "designed primarily to indicate when the
Department is likely to challenge mergers, not how it will conduct the litigation of cases
that it decides to bring." 1984 GUIDELINES, 2 Trade Reg. Rep. at 6879-7; 1982 GUIDELINES,
2 Trade Reg. Rep. at 6881-7. Indeed, the Second Circuit's perception that the Division
was being unfaithful to the Guidelines' concern with ease of entry may have contributed
to the Division's defeat in Waste Management. See Waste Management, 743 F.2d at 983 (if
Government regularly considers ease of entry, may not argue that it is "irrelevant"). The
question is thus not whether the Division should mention the Guidelines in litigation, but
whether and to what extent it should emphasize them.
9 But cf. Waste Management, 588 F. Supp. at 502 (rejecting both Government's and
defendant's proposed markets in case litigated before the Guidelines were issued). It is
interesting that the FTC's only defeat among the reviewed cases occurred when it featured
the Guidelines' foiling approach to market definition. See supra note 101.
70E.g., Harris & Jorde, Market Definition in the Merger Guidelines:Implicationsfor Antitrust
Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 464,481 (1983) ("simply impracticable"); Scheffman, Merger
Policy and Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission: The Economists's View, 54 ANTITRUST
L.J. 117, 119 (1985) ("the Guidelines ask a question to which it is difficult to get a good
answer"); Stigler & Sherwin, The Extent of the Market, 28 J.L. & ECON. 555, 582 (1985)
("completely nonoperational").
M But cf. Consolidated Gas Co. v. City Gas Co., 665 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D. Fla. 1987)
(following Guidelines to define market in monopolization case); Rice Growers Ass'n, 19862 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 61,462 (Guidelines-like language mentioned without citation);
OccidentalPetroleum Corp., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 62,512-13 (in opinion largely written
by defense counsel, Guidelines cited on geographic market definition, and foiling concept
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foiling test may serve a useful role in internal Division deliberations (and
is the right ultimate question), but the test is
it may pose what usually
1 2
unwieldy in litigation. T
The Division has advocated the Guidelines' approach to market definition in several cases, without success. In both Calmar and ADM the
courts showed disregard for the Guidelines' approach (this disregard is
the basis of the Division's ADM appeal). 73 The most colorful expression
of dubiety about the Division's approach was in Virginia National Bankshares.'74 This was the first case tried after the new Guidelines had been
issued, and the judge was unimpressed by the economic theorizing reflected in them. 7 5 The court reviewed with admiration the testimony of
local bankers, who described the realities of banking competition as they
saw it, and the court contrasted this with the Division's approach: "[W]hen
we consider the fact that what the government has here is speculative
based on what might happen as distinguished from the real world which
has been testified by the bankers in this case who are down at the grassroots and know what's going on," it would be "utterly foolish to go off
chasing rainbows."' 76
The Division's record also appears to have suffered from the Division's
occasional concern with legal questions not central to the case at hand.
discussed, with interchangeability, on product market definition); Calmar, 612 F. Supp. at
1301 (words similar to Guidelines' used, without citing Guidelines, but principal reliance
placed on product interchangeability); Bass Bros., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 68,820
("cross-elasticity of demand" and "reasonable interchangeability of use" tests used for
product market, but Guidelines-like language (without citing Guidelines) used for geographic market definition).
In contrast, the 1982 Guidelines' suggested concentration standards have been widely
cited. See, e.g., ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 86 (2d ed. Supp.
1986). By switching to a new measure of concentration (the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index),
the 1982 Guidelines achieved widespread attention to their recommended thresholds,
because no alternative HHI thresholds were available. See Calkins, The New MergerGuidelines
and the Herfindahl-HirschmanIndex, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 402 (1983).
sAccord Wertheimer, supra note 141, at 20.
'7"See Calmar,612 F. Supp. at 1301, 1303-04 (court used language of interchangeability
and of cross-elasticity, and, without citing Guidelines, of a foiling test; Government's
proposed market rejected because court perceived the products as interchangeable).
"' For the best post-mortem of this case, see Wertheimer, supra note 141.
'"The court also was unimpressed with the economist the Division retained to explain
its theory, whom the judge labeled "the poorest expert witness that I have seen," 1982-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) at 72,352, and with the Government's consumer survey, which was the
Guidelines-oriented heart of its case. The court found "that this statistical data is unreliable."
Id.
176 Id. at 72,353. Of course, the Division might have lost had it relied more heavily on
traditional tools of market definition. The Guidelines provided a convenient justification
for expanding the geographic market beyond the limits of much current competition, and
the Division could have been unsuccessful had it not relied on them.
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Judicial attention is limited. The court in Virginia National Bankshares
may have found it distracting or confusing for the Division to litigate
novel product market categories not determinative of the outcome. The
court in Central State Bank may have been confused by the Division's
emphasis on product market: the court's opinion devotes more space to
product market definition than to geographic market definition. (Certainly the Division's approach confused the defendants, whose pretrial
brief argued vigorously for expanding the product market beyond the
commercial banking market they assumed the Division would assert.'7 7 )
On appeal, a straightforward approach to litigating would have based
an appeal on geographic markets-perhaps even referring to submarkets-whereas the Division lost the appeal per curiam when it characterized the case as turning on product market definition (and then
championed a theory that, even if sound, is at least arguably at odds
with four Supreme Court cases).' 78 And although my involvement in
ADM five years ago makes it imprudent for me to venture an opinion
as to the merits of the case, it is at least unorthodox for a plaintiff to
respond to a summary judgment motion with a cross-motion. Thus, in
several merger cases the Division may have handicapped its litigation
efforts.
C. COMMENT

The Division appears to have litigated with a self-imposed handicap,
by adhering to its Guidelines and by pursuing ends other than simple
victory. Does this call for accolades or condemnation, bouquets or brickbrats? Does it reflect a far-sighted strategy to shape the law, at the possible
expense of immediate litigated cases? Is it an exemplary example of high
"' See supra note

144.
817 F.2d at 22 (citation omitted):
The record disclosed that the district court evaluated the evidence of record and
concluded that the government failed to factually support its claim that existing
circumstances in this case warranted a departure from the definition of the relevant
product market as the cluster of banking services traditionally offered in the
commercial banking industry adopted by the Supreme Court in United States v.
PhiladelphiaNational Bank.
Never has there been so gleeful a brief as that filed by the appellees. It joyfully characterized the Division's brief as raising "only one issue," namely, did the trial court err
when it followed three Supreme Court cases and found that commercial banking was the
relevant product market, in a geographic area in which no thrifts and only inconsequential
credit unions competed? Asking the question almost answers it. The brief also accused the
Government of misleading the court (see above), argued that the lower court's independent
finding of a two-county geographic market made the definition of the product market
academic, and argued that product market definition also was made academic by the lower
court's separate finding that competition had not been harmed. Brief of DefendantsAppellees, Central State Bank.
'18
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principle prevailing over a baser instinct to notch "kills"? Or is this an
example of a prosecuting office that has strayed impermissibly-or at
least unwisely-from its central mission, and may have lost its orientation
in the process?
As with so many issues, there is truth on both sides. The virtues of
the Division's approach are substantial. Even though the Guidelines warn
that they are merely internal standards that will not necessarily be followed in litigation, that disclaimer was written with false modesty. From
the beginning, the Division has proselytized, advertising the virtues of
the Guidelines as a superior method of antitrust analysis. Having proceeded in this fashion, it would be inconsistent for the Division to ignore
the Guidelines in its own litigation. The Division's credibility would be
compromised were it to campaign against a particular concept-"submarkets" is the most obvious example-and then seek refuge in the
concept for litigation purposes. 7 9 Moreover, as seen in Waste Management,
defendants will not hesitate to use the Division's Guidelines against it,
and courts may compel adherence.
Even apart from the Guidelines, an enforcement agency has a higher
calling than simply winning cases.' 0 Beyond the ethical imperative to
seek justice, not simply victory, the Division's mission is to educate as
well as to punish, and how better to educate than by example? In addition,
Division litigators ought to be cognizant of agendas larger than particular
cases. It can be entirely proper to advance an important novel theory
or as a deterrent'), or to strive
(important either for future litigation
82
to avoid harmful precedent.
Cf. JJ. Rousseau, DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 294 (1755) (Everyman's Library
Edition, G.D.H. Cole trans. 1950) ("For his [the ruler's] example is of such force, that even
if the people were willing to permit him to release himself from the yoke of the law, he
ought to be cautious in availing himself of so dangerous a prerogative, which others might
soon claim to usurp in their turn, and often use to his prejudice.").
E.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935):
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.
See also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648-49 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("The function of the prosecutor under the Federal Constitution is not to tack as many
skins of victims as possible to the wall."); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils
S.A., 107 S. Ct. 2124, 2135 (1987) ("The distinctive role of the prosecutor is expressed in
Ethical Consideration 7-13 of Canon 7 of the American Bar Association Model Code of
Professional Responsibility (1982): 'The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from
that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict."').
' Cf. United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.

STEPHEN CALKINS

Nonetheless, there are troubling aspects to the Division's approach to
merger litigation. The more the Division regards itself as advancing a
broad policy agenda, rather than simply winning meritorious cases, the
further it strays from its principal role as a law enforcer. Professor Kauper
has long and eloquently warned that if the Division is viewed as merely
another economic regulator, it risks slipping its moral anchor and becoming subject to political gusts that formerly might have passed it by. '"
Also at risk when the Division forsakes simple law enforcement is the
performance of the Division's duties to courts, to defendants, and to its
own staff.
The Division owes a duty to the court before which it practices. Merger
cases are factually complicated, and the application of legal standards to
these facts is even more challenging. A government lawyer should assist
a court to reach a correct result. 4 The Division may not have been as
helpful as it could. For instance, the Central State Bank appellate brief
was not especially useful. The trial court erred in defining the geographic
market (in my opinion), but the Division appealed on the basis of product
market definition-and somewhat misstated the holding of the court
below, in the process. The ADM appeal brief is another example. That
brief argued essentially that the district court erred because it failed to
apply the Guidelines' "foiling" approach to market definition. But, as
the Division acknowledged, that approach is not the law. If the district
court erred, it did so by applying accepted legal principles to the facts.
Although the Division also asserted that the court erred in its application
of the law, the argument was given short shrift. 5 Thus, the Division
8 6
has not provided as much assistance to trial courts as it might have.1
dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 420 (1985) (solicitation of price fix successfully challenged as attempted
monopolization).
"' Persons associated with the Division have been known to quote T.S. Eliot: "The last
temptation is the greatest treason: To do the right deed for the wrong reason." T.S. Eliot,
Murder in the Cathedral44 (1935).
'" E.g., Kauper, The Role of Economic Analysis in the Antitrust Division before and after the
Establishment of the Economic Policy Office: A Laryer's View, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 111, 132
(1984).
11 See generally Model Rules of Professional Responsibility Rule 3.3(a)(3) (1983) (obligation to disclose adverse precedent).
"5 This is only the second basis for appeal and only six pages are devoted to it. DOJ
ADM Appeal Brief at 37-43,
"I It also is unhelpful to allow subtle mischaracterizations of the law to go unchallenged.
This may have occurred in CentralState Bank. In reasoning that the product market should
be commercial banking, and not specific banking services as the Government urged, the
trial court stood traditional "submarket" analysis on its head. The court quoted the submarket discussion in two Supreme Court cases, United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, 402
U.S. 549 (1971), and PhillipsburgNational Bank: "While there may be within the market of
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The Division also has a duty to defendants not to conscript them
unfairly into intellectual excursions or law reform efforts, at their substantial expense. Much of a prosecutor's responsibility is to identify the
cases not to bring, the cases that do not deserve to be tried. Partly this
discretion reflects the limits of government resources, but partly it also
is a deliberately intended buffer in our legal system: some conduct does
not merit government challenge, even though the government could
prevail. Is it right for a prosecutor to file a suit that may shape the law
when that suit would not otherwise be filed? It is one thing to attempt
to expand the law to condemn particularly troubling conduct by major
corporations. 87 It is quite another to file a lawsuit against two tiny banks,
or to appeal a defeat in such a suit, without strongly believing the banks'
plans deserve to be stymied. One worries that Virginia NationalBankshares
was brought to test the Guidelines' approach to market definition, and
to advance the Division's agenda for reforming bank product market
definition, and that Central State Bank was brought or at least appealed
as part of that product market reform effort. The outcome of a case
cannot be a government lawyer's only concern, but it should remain the
dominant concern. 8
commercial banking identifiable submarkets, 'submarkets are not a basis for the disregard
of a broader line of commerce that has economic significance.' " 621 F. Supp. at 1291,
quoting Greater Buffalo Press, 402 U.S. at 554; PhillipsburgNational Bank, 399 U.S. at 360.
Of course, in both instances it was the defendant that was arguing for a narrow market
definition, and the Supreme Court neatly disposed of that argument by ruling that there
could be narrower submarkets as well as broader markets. Neither in those cases nor in
others has the Supreme Court ever suggested that an anticompetitive effect in a properly
defined submarket may be ignored where competition would not be adversely affected in
some broader market. Cf.PhiladelphiaNational Bank, 374 U.S. at 370 ("If anticompetitive
effects in one market could be justified by procompetitive consequences in another, the
logical upshot would be that every firm in an industry could, without violation of sec. 7,
embark on a series of mergers that would make it in the end as large as the industry
leader."). Yet nowhere in its appellate briefs did the Antitrust Division point out the extent
to which this language had been wrenched out of context.
187Cf.United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114(5th Cir. 1984), certdismissed,
106 S.Ct. 420 (1985).
' 88 'Moreover, courts may react adversely to a perception that a prosecutor is relatively
unconcerned about prevailing. Certainly defense lawyers believe this. The defendants'
pretrial brief in Virginia National Bankshares pointedly protested that "the Division seeks
to use this modest bank merger case as a vehicle for changing Section 7 law." Pretrial Brief
of the Defendant Banks at 3, Virginia Nat'l Bankshares (No. 82-0083B). So also, in Central
State Bank, the defendants prefaced their appeal brief by quotingJustice Harlan's dissenting
opinion in United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank & Trust Co.: "How could... [the
Justice Department] be efficiently allocating its own scarce resources if it chose to attack
a merger between two banks as small as those involved in this case? ...With tigers still at
large in our competitive jungle, why should the Department be taking aim at such small
game?" 399 U.S., 350, 373 (1970), quoted in Brief of Defendants-Appellees, at page preceding i, United States v. Central State Bank, 817 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1987). The perception
that a government agency has filed a case it would not bring but for an extraneous concern
inevitably will infect, at least in a minor way, the litigation of that case.
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Finally, a government agency owes a duty to its trial staff. If agency
leadership is relatively indifferent about a case's outcome, and is willing
to win it only the "right" way, how will this affect the trial staff's ability
to litigate even the approved approach? Few things are more demanding
than trial, and if staff lawyers perceive that the outcome of a case is
relatively unimportant to their superiors, will they be motivated to make
the sacrifices needed to try a case successfully?
How, then, should the balance be struck? Having announced its preferred approach to merger analysis, can the Antitrust Division rely on
different, albeit still valid, cases or theories to challenge mergers it has
concluded are harmful? (Obviously, the Division has no business challenging mergers it does not regard as harmful, whether it could block
them or not.) No one would suggest that the Division should act as can
a private lawyer, who is able to allege markets for which there is only
tenuous support and to rely on an unthinking application of cases that
have lost the respect of much of the antitrust community.' 89 But that is
not to say that the Division should never argue alternative markets or
invoke more traditional case law. There must be room for compromise
between principle and practicality, and the Division's course may have
veered too far from practicality. 9 °
FTC lawyers have been more pragmatic, perhaps in part because this
is sanctioned by the FTC Statement. The FTC Statement promises to
give weight to the Guidelines, but that is not the same as incorporating
them; instead, the Statement is somewhat less precise, is more respectful
of case law, and is not wedded to the foiling approach to market definition. Commission opinions are similar.
There also may be an institutional explanation for the FTC's greater
pragmatism. The Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust ("AAG") is
responsible for the positions the Division takes in litigation, and personally reviews all important briefs.' 9 ' Even if the AAG were permitted to
adopt divergent approaches when announcing policy and when litigating
cases, any such inconsistency inevitably would create personal dishar,"9 See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 757 (1986) ("Decisions abound in which an
action by a government lawyer has been criticized because, although it would have been
acceptable for a lawyer for a private-practice client to take the step in question, a government
lawyer is said to owe a higher standard of discretionary fairness than do private lawyers.")
(citing cases).
1'0 Of course, if the Division were to win its appeal in Archer-Daniels-Midlandin an opinion
squarely adopting the Guidelines as law, presumably it would regard its approach as entirely
vindicated.
,9, Cf. DOJ ADM Appeal Brief (signed by Charles F. Rule); DOJ Central State Appeal Brief
(signed by Douglas H. Ginsburg); DOJ Waste Management Appeal Brief (signed by J. Paul
McGrath).
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mony. Moreover, it is relatively easy for Division staff to know and
incorporate the views of the AAG. The FTC's structure is quite different.
It is comprised of five members with fixed, over-lapping terms, so a
president can change the dominant thinking at the Commission only
over time. The Commission is represented in court by the general counsel's office or, as is typical at the trial court level, by staff lawyers from
the appropriate Bureau. These lawyers are charged with representing
"the Commission,"' 92 which may mean representing a group that regularly experiences internal disharmony. Even where the commissioners
are in accord on an issue of policy, there is distance between policy
pronouncements and litigation strategy, because policy pronouncements
are issued by commissioners, but no commissioner is personally responsible for a position in litigation.'" (For instance, no commissioner's name
appears on a brief.) The chairman of the Commission appoints the
general counsel, and a commissioner with a particular interest (for instance, the author of an opinion being appealed) occasionally will review
a draft of a brief, but the briefing responsibility even of a chairman who
authored an opinion being defended is considerably more attenuated
than the comparable responsibility of an AAG. 194 Accordingly, Commission staff enjoy somewhat more autonomy than do their counterparts
at the Division.
Have the Commission's lawyers exercised their autonomy wisely? Certainly they have enjoyed great success in the cases they have litigated.' 95
The Commission merger briefs reviewed for this article are effective,
helpful statements of the law as applied by courts, and, simultaneously,
are generally consistent, or at least not inconsistent, with the FTC Statement and with Commission merger decisions. The briefs are not works
of high theory and do not purport to be; they are designed to win the
case, not change the law. Commission lawyers write briefs with humility,
and one hesitates before criticizing so scarce a virtue, even though the
humble path is not the only honorable one. On the other hand, several
19216

C.F.R. § 0.11 (1987).

191I understand the practice is different for amicus briefs, which are approved by the
Commission as a whole.
94This distance between the Commissioners and staff lawyers may help explain how,
in HCA, staff lawyers could defend a decision using several cases on which the Commission
had studiously declined to rely (or so thought Judge Posner). Commission lawyers defending a decision have only limited discretion, to be sure; when the Commission has based
its conclusion squarely on one rationale, a reviewing court may not approve it based on
another. E.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 106 S. Ct. 2009,
2016 (1986); Hospital Corp. of Am. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 807 F.2d at 1386. But it
is discretion nonetheless.
'95 See also Briggs & Calkins, supra note 40, at 322-23. (Commission has enjoyed great
success in recent court cases).
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Commission briefs contain arguments that might not garner majority
support at the Commission (for instance, concerning submarkets). If this
is true, it is anomalous, at best, and suggests that the Commission staff
may be erring too far toward practicality.
III. CONCLUSION
A review of recent merger litigation shows that, at least in the small
sample of decisions reported since William Baxter assumed responsibility
for the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, the Antitrust Division
has differed from private parties and even the FTC in its close adherence
to the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines, particularly with respect
to market definition, and, at times, in its greater concern with shaping
the law rather than merely prevailing on the merits. The Division's approach may have contributed to its unimpressive "won-lost" record in
court, although the approach has plausible justifications.
Recent merger litigation also shows that the established case law remains extant, available for use by private parties and, significantly, a
more activist Antitrust Division.1 96 Courts continue to cite the familiar
Supreme Court precedents-especially PhiladelphiaNational Bank and
Brown Shoe. Even economically sophisticated judges continue to view
merger litigation as turning principally on market shares and barriers
to entry.' 9 Recent decisions serve as a reminder that the reports of the
demise of traditional merger law may have been exaggerated. Of course,
an approach focusing on market shares and entry barriers promises
considerable latitude for skillful lawyering, since neither market definition nor the measurement of entry conditions is governed by law that
is binding or precise. The private cases of the past few years show that
markets can be defined quite narrowly and that rather modest impediments to entry can be sufficient to raise antitrust concern, at least if
the judge is sympathetic.
Finally, it is evident that documents remain central to merger litigation.
It is astounding that after decades of counseling by the antitrust bar,
business people continue to generate paper as damaging as that found
11 The Antitrust Division implicitly recognized this when it attempted (unsuccessfully,
it appears) to amend Clayton Act § 7 more or less to reflect the Guidelines. See Ginsburg,
The Reagan Administration'sLegislative Initiative in Antitrust, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 851, 855
(1986) ("the current language of section 7 carries the baggage of decades of inconsistent
and economically unsophisticated judicial merger analyses").
'9 This should not be entirely surprising, since even the author of the 1982 Guidelines,
William Baxter, has said that these two factors should be the essence of most merger
litigation. CounselingYour Client on Monopolization, Mergers, andJointVentures, 55 ANTITRUST
L.J. 321, 328, 330-31 (1986) (comments of William Baxter).
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in Tasty Cake and PPG.98
' Although many have disparaged the importance
of allegedly incriminating documents, documents are difficult to refute
and can undercut the persuasiveness of the most brilliant theoretician.
In light of this, any firm that views antitrust counseling as unnecessary
in the modern era is sorely misinformed.

"I See supra notes 67, 89.

